

Original Research Article**Evolution of a disease surveillance system: an increase in reporting of human monkeypox disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2001-2013****ABSTRACT**

Objective: Evaluating the effectiveness of a surveillance system, and how it improves over time has significant implications for disease control and prevention. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) was implemented to estimate the burden of disease, monitor changes in disease occurrence, and inform resource allocation. For this effort we utilized national passive surveillance data from DRC's IDSR to explore reporting trends of human monkeypox (MPX) from 2001 to 2013.

Methods: We obtained surveillance data on MPX cases occurring between January 2001 and December 2013 from the DRC Ministry of Health (MoH). Phases of the surveillance system, yearly trends in reporting and estimated incidence for MPX were analyzed using SAS v9.2 and Health Mapper.

Results: Between 2001 and 2013, three discrete surveillance phases were identified that described the evolution of the surveillance system. Overall, an increase in suspected MPX cases was reported, beyond what would be expected from simply an improved reporting system. When restricting the analysis to the "stable phase," national estimated incidence increased from 2.13 per 100,000 in 2008 to 2.84 per 100,000 in 2013.

Conclusions: The reported increase in MPX, based on an evolving surveillance system, is likely to be a true increase in disease occurrence rather than simply improvements to the surveillance system. Further analyses should provide critical information for improved prevention and control strategies and highlight areas of improvement for future data collection efforts.

27 *Keywords: monkeypox, passive surveillance, disease trends, Democratic Republic of Congo*

28

29 **1. INTRODUCTION**

30 The systematic collection of surveillance data has significant implications for effective disease
31 control and prevention.(1) Well-functioning surveillance systems can be used to estimate the burden of
32 disease, monitor changes in disease occurrence, assess geographic spread, identify high-risk
33 populations and other health concerns, and inform resource allocation.(2, 3) Therefore, evaluating the
34 effectiveness of surveillance systems, and how they improve over time, is a critical health imperative.

35 In 1998, the World Health Organization's Regional Office for Africa (WHO-AFRO) established the
36 Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) unit to strengthen public health surveillance and
37 disease response in a number of African countries.(3-5) Diseases with epidemic potential or those
38 targeted for elimination/eradication are considered notifiable in the IDSR unit, and each individual country
39 may incorporate other diseases of public health importance that require reporting.(6) This surveillance
40 system relies on passive collection of data sent from health care facilities throughout each country on a
41 weekly basis.(7)

42 In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the IDSR was implemented in 2000 under the
43 Ministry of Health (MoH) Direction for Disease Control (DLM). Implementation of an effective surveillance
44 system, however, has been challenging. Decades of political and social instability have resulted in the
45 deterioration of the health care system.(8, 9) The country continues to recover from a multi-year civil
46 conflict that left many areas without modern roads or transportation and produced more than one million
47 refugees and internally displaced persons.(10) Moreover, cross-border incursions and rebel insurgencies
48 continue to occur in the eastern part of the country. These obstacles make communication and
49 supervision of local health centers, as well as disease surveillance and reporting, extremely difficult. Much
50 of the country's inaccessible terrain is heavily forested and has been identified as ideal geographic
51 locations for emergence of viral diseases, including human monkeypox (MPX).(11)

52 Monkeypox is a zoonotic viral infection found in a variety of mammals, including humans.(11, 12)
53 It is indigenous to the Congo River Basin and is endemic among a variety of wild animals including
54 rodents and monkeys, which are the primary vectors to humans.(13, 14) When humans are infected with
55 MPX they typically develop a less severe smallpox-like illness that includes a fever and pustules, which
56 usually presents in extremities (feet, hands, and face) and crust over after 10 days.(12, 15) A large

57 majority of worldwide cases are reported in DRC, where the disease is endemic in forest animals with
58 frequent spillover into the human population.(11) While MPX has been an IDSR reportable disease in
59 DRC since 2001, the true burden remains largely unknown, with no reliable national estimates, likely
60 because MPX cases often occur in remote locations that are difficult to access. Underreporting is
61 common, and diagnosis in the field cannot be confirmed without polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing,
62 presenting challenges for conducting research based on the ecology, epidemiology, natural history, and
63 pathogenesis of the infection.(16-18)

64 Despite the challenges, surveillance data can be used to assess disease incidence trends over
65 time to inform policy in resource limited settings.(19) Therefore, we utilized national passive surveillance
66 data from DRC's IDSR to explore reporting trends of MPX from 2001 to 2013. This paper examines one
67 system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and how monkeypox surveillance has developed
68 over the last 14 years.

69 **2. METHODS**

70 **2.1 Suspected MPX Case Counts**

71 MPX is one of 13 reportable diseases in DRC's IDSR.(20) The definition of a suspected case of
72 MPX has remained unchanged since its inclusion in the IDSR in 2001: "any person appearing with a
73 sudden onset of high fever, followed a few days later by a vesicular-pustule eruption presenting
74 predominantly on the face, palms of the hands, and soles of the feet; or the presence of at least 5
75 smallpox type scabs."(20)

76 Suspected MPX cases and deaths are reported weekly to each of the 516 health zones in 11
77 provinces.(20) Since these data were collected the nation has been divided into 26 separate provinces,
78 but this analysis will refer to the old 11 provinces. Across the country, over 10,000 health centers are
79 required to send weekly written reports of suspected MPX case counts.(20) Reported information also
80 includes province, district (composed of about 5-10 health zones), health zone and patient age group (0-
81 11 months, 12-59 months, and 5 years +).

82

83

84

85 **2.2 Descriptive Analyses**

86 MPX case counts, estimated incidence rates, and 95% confidence intervals were calculated at
 87 the national and provincial levels. A negative binomial distribution was used to account for over-
 88 dispersion with the logarithm of the yearly population as an offset variable. The proportion of health zones
 89 reporting MPX was calculated by dividing the number of health zones reporting ≥ 1 MPX case during a
 90 given year by the number of health zones reporting any reportable disease in the same year (Table 1).
 91 Incidence was defined as number of cases reported by health zone over the estimated population for that
 92 zone. We utilized Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) population estimates, which provided the
 93 only available health zone level population data.(18, 21-23) Duplicate entries with the same health zone
 94 name and epidemiological week were removed. All analyses were performed using SAS v9.4(24) and
 95 maps were created using Health Mapper 4.3.(25)

96 **Table 1. Number of health zones reporting suspected monkeypox cases to the IDSR, 2001-2013**
97

Year	# Suspected cases	# HZ Reporting 1 or more MPX	# HZ reporting any disease	% Reporting MPX ¹
2001	388	31	253	12.3
2002	881	50	292	17.1
2003	755	44	295	14.9
2004	1024	77	374	20.6
2005	1708	83	454	18.3
2006	783	76	464	16.4
2007	970	90	464	19.4
2008	1599	119	502	23.7
2009	1919	108	502	21.5
2010	2322	107	504	21.2
2011	2208	123	507	24.3
2012	2629	133	508	26.2
2013	2460	136	514	26.5
TOTAL	19646	264	514	52.5

98
 99 ¹% Reporting MPX was calculated by the number of health zones reporting more than one case of MPX
 100 during a given year divided by the number of health zones reported any reportable disease in a given year
 101
 102

103 **2.3 Changes in Disease Reporting**

104 We defined three conceptual phases of the passive reporting system based on historical events
105 and changes to the surveillance system: 1) Implementation Phase (2001-2003): the program was not fully
106 implemented due to widespread political instability, and few health zones were reporting; 2) Adjustment
107 Phase (2004-2007): political instability was reduced and there was increased and consistent reporting of
108 diseases throughout the country; and 3) Stable Phase (2008-2013): almost all health zones were
109 reporting regularly, and there were no major changes to the reporting system. We conducted t-tests of
110 mean incidence by implementation phase.

111 In order to estimate the changes in reporting over time, we utilized suspected Acute Flaccid
112 Paralysis (AFP) and tetanus case counts reported to the IDSR for pattern comparison, because both of
113 these diseases were expected to have constant background reporting rates. AFP was selected based on
114 a consistent background rate (2 cases per 100,000 population),(26) while reporting of tetanus was
115 expected to remain stable or decrease with increasing immunization.(27) Mean annual percent change in
116 disease incidence was calculated using generalized linear models (GLM). Sensitivity analyses were
117 performed by removing the Tshuapa (12 health zones) and Sankuru (12 health zones) districts from the
118 available data, as active MPX surveillance had been implemented in both districts to determine if areas
119 with active surveillance was the main factor for increase in disease reporting.

120 **3. RESULTS**

121 **3.1 Overall MPX Trends**


122 From 2001 to 2013 the number of health zones reporting any reportable disease increased from
123 253 to 514. During the same time period 19,646 suspected MPX cases reported and the number of health
124 zones reporting a case increased from 31 to 136. (Table 1). The lowest reported incidence for suspected
125 MPX cases was in 2001(0.64 per 100,000) and the highest was in 2012 (3.11 per 100,000 persons). This
126 observation remained true after removal of the two active surveillance areas (0.61 and 2.0 per 100,000
127 persons, respectively) (Table 2). Suspected cases of MPX were most commonly reported in the northern
128 and central portion of the country (Figure 1). Equateur province had the highest mean incidence over the
129 13 years, as well as highest annual reported incidence, of suspected MPX cases, followed by Kasai
130 Oriental and Maniema provinces (Table 3). From 2001 to 2013 there was a significant increase in

131 reported cases of MPX ($p < 0.001$). This trend remained significant after the removal of the Tshuapa and
 132 Sankuru districts (Table 4).

133 **Table 2. Suspected MPX Incidence in DRC (with and without the active surveillance areas), 2001-**
 134 **2013**
 135

Year	Incidence, per 100,000, 95% CI	Incidence per 100,000 (without active surveillance areas), 95% CI
2001	0.64 (0.09, 4.50)	0.61 (0.09, 4.30)
2002	1.4 (0.20, 9.90)	0.94 (0.13, 6.70)
2003	1.16 (0.16, 8.30)	0.72 (0.10, 5.10)
2004	1.53 (0.22, 10.90)	0.82 (0.12, 5.80)
2005	2.48 (0.35, 17.60)	0.96 (0.13, 6.80)
2006	1.11 (0.16, 7.80)	0.67 (0.09, 4.80)
2007	1.33 (0.19, 9.40)	0.60 (0.08, 4.20)
2008	2.13 (0.30, 15.10)	1.00 (0.15, 7.40)
2009	2.48 (0.35, 17.60)	1.20 (0.17, 8.80)
2010	2.91 (0.42, 20.70)	1.40 (0.19, 9.60)
2011	2.69 (0.38, 19.10)	1.60 (0.23, 11.60)
2012	3.11 (0.44, 22.10)	2.00 (0.28, 14.40)
2013	2.82 (0.40, 20.10)	1.50 (0.22, 10.90)

136
 137



138
 139
 140
 141
 142
 143

Figure 1. Disease reporting to the IDSR, 2001-2013

144
145
146

Table 3. Suspected MPX Incidence in selected provinces of DRC, 2001-2013

Year	Equateur ^{1,2}	Kasai Oriental ^{1,3}	Maniema ¹	Bandundu ¹	Oriental ¹	Kasai Occidental ¹
2001	0.53	0.83	0.06	2.20	0.07	2.70
2002	6.58	3.84	0.06	0.88	0.26	0.49
2003	4.60	0.16	0.48	1.66	3.23	0.34
2004	3.40	4.94	0.17	1.59	1.74	1.08
2005	8.29	11.26	1.01	0.20	0.82	0.52
2006	2.48	3.66	0.82	1.23	2.07	0.06
2007	2.03	6.20	0.48	1.49	0.83	1.45
2008	9.66	4.82	0.41	1.71	0.79	1.86
2009	10.71	5.96	3.55	3.32	0.54	0.65
2010	12.19	7.91	7.39	3.22	0.34	0.36
2011	10.98	4.43	6.98	3.14	2.64	0.75
2012	11.02	6.88	5.96	2.78	2.19	3.67
2013	12.83	5.78	2.67	1.52	1.90	2.25
TOTAL	7.69	5.25	2.53	1.91	1.37	1.28

147
148
149
150
151

1. Incidence: per 100,000 persons
2. Tshuapa District located in this Province
3. Sankuru District located in this Province

Table 4. Mean percent change in predicted yearly incidence for MPX, Tetanus, AFP (2001-2013, 2001-2007, and 2008-2013)

Disease Reported	All Years (2001-2013)			Phase 1+2 (Years 2001-2007)			Phase 3 (Years 2008-2013)		
	% Change	95% CI	P-value	% Change	95% CI	P-value	% Change	95% CI	P-value
MPX (whole country)	10.5	(6.2, 15.0)	<0.001	9.4	(-4.9, 25.9)	0.197	6.2	(2.0, 9.4)	0.002
MPX (without active surveillance areas)	8.3	(5.1, 11.6)	<0.001	-2.0	(-8.6, 5.1)	0.628	10.5	(5.1, 17.3)	<0.001
AFP	3.0	(-2.0, 8.3)	0.236	-4.9	(-18.9, 12.7)	0.586	-3.0	(-6.8, 2.0)	0.297
Tetanus	-3.9	(-6.8, -1.0)	0.003	-4.9	(-10.4, 2.0)	0.182	-1.0	(-6.8, 5.1)	0.756


155
156

3.2 Phases of the IDSR

3.2.1 Implementation Phase

We considered the years 2001-2003 the “implementation phase.” The IDSR had recently been introduced and MPX, AFP, and tetanus were all included as reportable diseases. During this phase, a

160 total of 2,024 suspected MPX cases were reported. Kasai Occidental and Bandundu Provinces had the
 161 highest incidence (2.70 per 100,000 persons and 2.20 per 100,000 persons, respectively). During this
 162 phase, there was high variation in AFP and tetanus incidence (Figure 2), leading us to conclude that there
 163 would be similar instability in the reporting for MPX.
 164



165
 166 **Figure 2. Disease reporting to the IDSR, 2001-2014**

167
 168 **3.2.2 Adjustment Phase**

169 We considered 2004 to 2007 the “adjustment phase.” The implementation and adjustment phase
 170 combined incidence based on a chi-square test were not significantly different ($p=0.54$, data not shown).
 171 If a health zone reported case counts for at least one disease during an epidemiologic week, we assumed
 172 all other diseases with missing case counts to have zero cases. During this phase, the IDSR integrated
 173 additional variables, including age categories, case-fatality rates, and health zone populations. This time
 174 also marked the end of widespread civil unrest.

175 Between 2005 and 2006, there was a sharp increase, followed by a decrease in the national
 176 estimated MPX incidence (2.48 per 100,000 persons to 1.11 per 100,000 persons) (Table 2). Both Kasai
 177 Oriental and Equateur provinces had similar trends. In comparison, tetanus reporting remained relatively

178 stable while there was continual fluctuation of AFP reporting, however these changes were not significant
179 (2001-2007: $p=0.586$ (tetanus) and $p=0.182$ (AFP)) (Table 4).

180

181 **3.2.3 Stable Phase**

182 We consider 2008-2013, the “stable reporting phase.” By 2008, there were 515 health zones (a
183 516th was added in 2012), with 502 of those reporting at least one case of any reportable disease during
184 the year compared to 464 the year before. Both the implementation and adjustment phase differed
185 significantly in the mean number of suspected cases reported yearly from the stable phase ($p<0.05$)
186 (Table 4). We again assumed all other diseases with missing case counts to have zero cases for other
187 reportable diseases when health zones reported cases for at least one disease each week. The number
188 of health zones reporting any disease stayed fairly stable, and there were no changes to the case
189 definitions of the 15 reportable diseases. A second active surveillance program was implemented in
190 2008, in the Tshuapa District (comprised of 12 health zones) of the Equateur province. As Table 3
191 indicates, this led to increased incidence of suspected MPX reported in the district.

192 Reported MPX incidence between 2008 and 2013 (2.13 to 2.84 per 100,000, respectively)
193 increased significantly, with an estimated change in incidence per year of 6.2% (95% C.I.: 2.0%, 9.4%,
194 $p=0.002$). Equateur and Kasai Oriental provinces had the highest incidence for 2013 (12.83 and 5.78 per
195 100,000, persons respectively). The predicted trend in incidence remained significant after removal of the
196 Sankuru and Tshuapa Districts ($p<0.001$), which had superior health care worker training on recognition
197 of MPX disease and reporting requirements. While the number of health zones reporting any disease
198 during this time period increased by 12 (502 to 514), there were 5 additional health zones reporting at
199 least 1 case of suspected MPX, indicating that it may be spreading geographically (Table 1).
200 Simultaneously, the estimated change in annual incidence for AFP indicated a slight decrease, but it was
201 not significant (-3.0%, 95% C.I.: -6.8%, 2.0%, $p=0.297$). The same trend was seen for tetanus, which
202 showed a slight but non-significant decrease from 2008 to 2013 (-1.0%, 95% C.I.: -6.8%, 5.1%, $p=0.756$)
203 (Table 4).

204

205

206 4. DISCUSSION

207 The results suggest that reported MPX incidence increased between 2001 and 2013 and that the
208 increase cannot be explained solely by improvements to the surveillance system. While an active MPX
209 surveillance program conducted from 1981-1986 by WHO suggested that the observed increase in MPX
210 incidence was a result of strengthened surveillance activities, our evaluation 15 years later suggests a
211 real increase.⁽¹²⁾ Between 2001 and 2013, there was an almost 4-fold increase in estimated MPX
212 incidence, with the largest increase during the stable phase. Moreover, the consistency of AFP and
213 tetanus reporting in the same health zones and years provide more evidence for this increase.

214 Our analyses highlighted three distinct phases since IDSR implementation in 2001. During the
215 “implementation” phase, there were inconsistencies in disease reporting and fewer health zones reporting
216 cases (289 in 2003 to 514 in 2013). During the adjustment phase, the number of health zones reporting
217 diseases increased substantially, however, reporting gaps remained, notably in the northwestern region
218 of the country. Confusion with the collection of additional variables and the declaration of the end of the
219 second war may partially explain inconsistencies. While intertribal and rebel group fighting continued to
220 occur, the declaration increased stability within the country.⁽¹⁰⁾ By 2008, almost all health zones were
221 regularly reporting to the IDSR, and there were no additional changes to the system. During the stable
222 phase (2008-2013), we saw the largest increase in MPX reporting.

223 A number of factors may be contributing to the observed increase in MPX incidence: (1)
224 increasing vaccinia-naïve populations; (2) decreasing immunity among previously vaccinated
225 persons;⁽¹⁸⁾ and (3) increased dependence on bush meat as a regular source of nutritional
226 sustenance.⁽²⁸⁻³⁰⁾ While misclassification of other rash illnesses reported to the IDSR could lead to an
227 artificial increase in estimated MPX incidence, MPX specimens tested at the National Institute for
228 Biomedical Research (INRB) should be used to further validate our results.

229 During the stable phase, 17 additional health zones reported at least one suspected case of MPX
230 – a 2.8% increase from 2008 to 2013. This could be indicative of not only an increase in MPX incidence,
231 but also an expanding geographic distribution of disease. Ecological niche modeling supports this
232 hypothesis and suggests that the distribution of MPX cases could extend to most of the country, including
233 the eastern provinces in less heavily forested areas.⁽¹⁷⁾ (16, 31)

234 Our results are consistent with an active surveillance program conducted between 2005 and 2007
235 in the Sankuru District, which suggested an increase in incidence compared to the 1980's
236 surveillance.(18) Our estimated incidence was lower than those found in the Sankuru District, likely
237 explained by the active case-finding methodology employed.

238 Between 2005 and 2006, there was an unexpectedly sharp increase, then decrease in cases
239 reported to the IDSR. However, based on the active surveillance system in the Sankuru District, there
240 was an increase in 2006 in the number of samples collected and confirmed at the national laboratory.(18)
241 This suggests that surveillance may have been focused on specimen collection rather than passive
242 reporting in 2006; however by 2007 more cases were reported to the IDSR system.

243 Our analyses are subject to a number of limitations. Case reporting is likely to be severely
244 underestimated, data completeness is questionable and little information is collected beyond age data.
245 While over 10,000 health centers are required to report weekly case counts to their respective health
246 zone offices, only a small proportion of them consistently send the data. Additionally, traditional healers,
247 prayer houses, and privately-run clinics are not always required to participate in case reporting(32).
248 While, the INRB collects samples for laboratory analysis from health zones with suspected MPX cases,
249 linkage to the IDSR system remains incomplete.

250 There is likely to be substantial disease misclassification, as the case-definition is non-specific,
251 and thus may have biased our results. For example, Varicella meets the MPX case definition, and several
252 rash illnesses are sometimes misdiagnosed as MPX, possibly inflating the estimated incidence. There is
253 no reason, however, to believe that misclassification is occurring at a higher rate in recent years than
254 when the reporting system was initiated. An unavoidable weakness is that incidence estimates are likely
255 to be biased due to inaccurate population estimates.(18, 21-23) Large-scale population movement during
256 the past two decades due to civil conflict and transient rural populations in the forest or near the rivers
257 could impact population estimates, which are currently based on the most recent available data – 1984
258 census. We attempted to reduce the likelihood of this through use of the standard estimate of population
259 growth in the DRC.(21)

260 The use of aggregated data limits the ability to make causal inferences on an individual's risk of
261 disease.(33) Ecologic bias, disease and exposure misclassification within groups, temporal ambiguity,

262 and an inability to control for all confounders can lead to significant bias.(33) We did not have data on all
263 potential confounders, including age, sex, positive confirmation of cases, and if the cases were due to
264 animal or human contact, which could affect our estimated MPX incidence.(33)

265 Given the limited resources in DRC, extensive analyses utilizing the surveillance data are rarely
266 accomplished. Despite these structural and reporting limitations, we still observed a significant increase in
267 estimated MPX incidence and an expansion of the geographic distribution of disease. Based on our
268 analyses, additional research should target provinces with the highest estimated incidence: Equateur,
269 Kasai Oriental, Orientale, and Maniema. While small-scale programs targeting clinical characteristics and
270 individual risk factors to MPX have already been implemented in specific districts,(18, 34) more research
271 is needed to determine the major ecologic and behavioral factors contributing to the observed increase in
272 estimated incidence, which could include a better understanding of the changing bush meat trading
273 system. For areas lacking targeted interventions, but where estimated MPX incidence has increased,
274 evaluations should be undertaken to determine if an active surveillance system is necessary or if sentinel
275 surveillance sites should be established.

276 In the DRC there is a need for additional investment at the operational level to strengthen passive
277 reporting. While the IDSR reached a stable phase in 2008, many health zones are still limited in their
278 ability to submit weekly reports in a timely manner, thus leading to possible delays in outbreak
279 notification. More streamlined reporting methodology, increased feedback from the national to the local
280 level, and improved linkage between passive and the case-based surveillance systems will be necessary
281 as we aim improve our understanding of MPX disease occurrence and distribution. These improvements
282 could lead to a broader impact on the surveillance system as a whole for the reporting of other emerging
283 pathogens and diseases targeted for eradication in the DRC and Central Africa.

284

285

286 **Ethics Approval:** This study was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee of the Kinshasa
287 School of Public Health, Kinshasa, DRC and by the Institutional Review Board of Human Research Ethics
288 at the University of California, Los Angeles.

289

290 **REFERENCES**

- 291
- 292 1. CDC Guidelines Working Group. Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public
293 Health Surveillance Systems. *MMWR Recommendations and Reports*.
294 2001;50(RR13):1-35.
- 295 2. Thacker SB, Stroup DF. Future directions for comprehensive public health
296 surveillance and health information systems in the United States. *American journal of*
297 *epidemiology*. 1994;140(5):383-97.
- 298 3. AFRO W. Integrated Disease Surveillance Strategy in the African Region: a
299 regional strategy for communicable diseases 1999–2003. Harare, Zimbabwe: WHO
300 Regional Office for Africa; 1999.
- 301 4. Nsubuga P, Brown W, Groseclose S, Ahadzie L, Talisuna A, Mmbuji P, et al.
302 Implementing integrated disease surveillance and response: four African countries'
303 experience, 1998–2005. *Global public health*. 2010;5(4):364-80.
- 304 5. AFRO W. Assessment protocol for national disease surveillance systems and
305 epidemic preparedness and response. Harare, Zimbabwe: WHO Regional Office for
306 Africa; 2000.
- 307 6. Buehler JW. Surveillance. In: Rothman KJ, Greenland S, editors. *Modern*
308 *Epidemiology*. 2nd ed. Philadelphia, PA: Lippencott-Raven; 1998.
- 309 7. Immunization essentials: A practical field guide. USAID, editor2003.
- 310 8. Waldman R. Health in fragile states. Country case study: Democratic Republic of
311 the Congo. 2006.
- 312 9. Wembonyama S, Mpaka S, Tshilolo L. [Medicine and health in the Democratic
313 Republic of Congo: from Independence to the Third Republic]. *Medecine tropicale:*
314 *revue du Corps de sante colonial*. 2007;67(5):447-57.
- 315 10. Supervie V, Halima Y, Blower S. Assessing the impact of mass rape on the
316 incidence of HIV in conflict-affected countries. *Aids*. 2010;24(18):2841-7.
- 317 11. Parker S, Nuara A, Buller RML, Schultz DA. Human monkeypox: an emerging
318 zoonotic disease. 2007.
- 319 12. Jezek Z, Fenner F. Human Monkeypox. Meinick JL, editor1988.
- 320 13. Khodakevich L, Szczeniowski M, Jezek Z, Marennikova S, Nakano J, Messinger
321 D. The role of squirrels in sustaining monkeypox virus transmission. *Tropical and*
322 *geographical medicine*. 1987;39(2):115-22.
- 323 14. Khodakevich L, Ježek Z, Messinger D. Monkeypox virus: ecology and public
324 health significance. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*. 1988;66(6):747.
- 325 15. Ježek Z, Grab B, Szczeniowski M, Paluku K, Mutombo M. Clinico-
326 epidemiological features of monkeypox patients with an animal or human source of
327 infection. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*. 1988;66(4):459.
- 328 16. Fuller T, Thomassen HA, Mulembakani PM, Johnston SC, Lloyd-Smith JO,
329 Kisalu NK, et al. Using remote sensing to map the risk of human monkeypox virus in the
330 Congo Basin. *EcoHealth*. 2011;8(1):14-25.
- 331 17. Levine RS, Peterson AT, Yorita KL, Carroll D, Damon IK, Reynolds MG.
332 Ecological niche and geographic distribution of human monkeypox in Africa. *PLoS One*.
333 2007;2(1):e176.
- 334 18. Rimoin AW, Mulembakani PM, Johnston SC, Lloyd Smith JO, Kisalu NK, Kinkela
335 TL, et al. Major increase in human monkeypox incidence 30 years after smallpox

- 336 vaccination campaigns cease in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *Proc Natl Acad Sci*
337 *U S A.* 2010;107(37):16262-7.
- 338 19. Nsubuga P, White ME, Thacker SB, Anderson MA, Blount SB, Broome CV, et al.
339 Public health surveillance: a tool for targeting and monitoring interventions. 2006.
- 340 20. MOH. Guide Technique pour la surveillance integree de la maladie et riposte:
341 SIMR. In: Maladie DdLC, editor. 2nd ed. Kinshasa, DRC2011.
- 342 21. De Maeyer M, Wolff E. The Mapping of the Urban Growth of Kinshasa (DRC)
343 Through High Resolution Remote Sensing Between 1995 and 2005.
- 344 22. Mancini S, Coldiron ME, Ronsse A, Ilunga BK, Porten K, Grais RF. Description of
345 a large measles epidemic in Democratic Republic of Congo, 2010–2013. *Conflict and*
346 *health.* 2014;8(1):9.
- 347 23. Grout L, Minetti A, Hurtado N, François G, Fermon F, Chatelain A, et al. Measles
348 in Democratic Republic of Congo: an outbreak description from Katanga, 2010–2011.
349 *BMC infectious diseases.* 2013;13(1):232.
- 350 24. SAS Institute Inc. 9.4. In: SAS Institute Inc., editor. Cary, NC.2000.
- 351 25. WHO. Health Mapper. In: WHO, editor. Geneva, Switzerland2013.
- 352 26. Odoom JK, Ntim NAA, Sarkodie B, Addo J, Minta-Asare K, Obodai E, et al.
353 Evaluation of AFP surveillance indicators in polio-free Ghana, 2009–2013. *BMC public*
354 *health.* 2014;14(1):1.
- 355 27. WHO. Surviellance Geneva, Switzerland2014 [Available from:
356 <http://www.polioeradication.org/Dataandmonitoring/Surveillance.aspx>.
- 357 28. De Merode E, Homewood K, Cowlshaw G. The value of bushmeat and other
358 wild foods to rural households living in extreme poverty in Democratic Republic of
359 Congo. *Biological conservation.* 2004;118(5):573-81.
- 360 29. Poulsen J, Clark C, Mavah G, Elkan P. Bushmeat supply and consumption in a
361 tropical logging concession in northern Congo. *Conservation Biology.* 2009;23(6):1597-
362 608.
- 363 30. Wilkie DS, Carpenter JF. Bushmeat hunting in the Congo Basin: an assessment
364 of impacts and options for mitigation. *Biodiversity & Conservation.* 1999;8(7):927-55.
- 365 31. McCollum AM, Nakazawa Y, Ndongala GM, Pukuta E, Karhemere S, Lushima
366 RS, et al. Human Monkeypox in the Kivus, a Conflict Region of the Democratic Republic
367 of the Congo. *The American journal of tropical medicine and hygiene.* 2015;93(4):718-
368 21.
- 369 32. Programme Elargi De Vaccination. Plan Stratégique d'élimination de la Rougeole
370 en RDC: 2012-2020. 2012.
- 371 33. Morgenstern H. *Ecologic Studies.* In: Rothman KJ, Greenland S, Lash TL,
372 editors. *Modern Epidemiology.* 3rd ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins; 2008.
- 373 34. Bass J, Tack DM, McCollum AM, Kabamba J, Pakuta E, Malekani J, et al.
374 Enhancing health care worker ability to detect and care for patients with monkeypox in
375 the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *International health.* 2013;5(4):237-43.
376