

Original Research Article

Medication errors and Root Causes Analysis: emerging views and practices in King Saud Medical City, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Running Title:

Medication Errors and Root Cause Analysis

Abstract

Background: Medication errors (MEs) are associated with significant morbidity and mortality, and huge cost worldwide. Medication errors are multifactorial and present in different forms with variable severity. Many tools are developed to analyze MEs for knowing the main etiological factor and preventing their occurrence. **Objective:** This minireview narratively describes the emerging views and practices concerning MEs and root cause analysis (RCA) in King Saud Medical City (KSMC) supported by relevant international literature. **Methods:** Electronic searches of PubMed and Google Scholar using keywords were made to identify relevant articles published in English literature of the past 10 years. For illustrative purpose, three case scenarios of MEs with step-wise process of RCA were presented in this research. **Results:** A number of programs, orientation sessions, policies and procedures, ME reporting system, guidelines and action plan were developed to identify and prevent MEs, and RCA of MEs was the most important assessment tool to recognize the main causes underlying MEs in KSMC. **Conclusion:** Several programs, developed and implemented in KSMC over the past few years match with international evidence-based data, and RCA is an effective tool to detect, analyze and prevent MEs in this medical city. This minireview calls for further research on MEs and root cause analysis in other hospitals of Saudi Arabia.

Keywords: Medication errors, root cause analysis, prevention, medication error reporting system.

Introduction


Medication errors (MEs) are an important cause of significant morbidity and mortality and financial burden on public health around the world. MEs are multifactorial, present in different forms and severity, and are observed in all age groups of people. The etiologies of MEs include unsafe management of medications, wrongly written prescriptions and dispensing of incorrect medications, non-existence of medication safety and quality assurance programs, and

30 lack of health information technology (HIT) integration into the healthcare system[1-5].Most
31 medication errors are preventable and electronic prescribing system [EPS],a powerful tool to
32 prevent MEs, is in place in KSMC since 2006 [6-8].Surprisingly, recent reports suggest that
33 electronic reporting systems may create some barriers against reporting medication errors
34 especially **access problems to system and time constraints. This study suggested some steps**
35 **including training and education of concerned professionals, technology acceptance, feedback**
36 **reports, supportive organizational structure, blame-free culture, and appropriate policies in place**
37 **in healthcare organizations [9].** Notably, handwritten prescription errors are prevented by 50%
38 using EPS [10].

39 Medication errors are reported more in an integrated blame free culture compared to
40 blame supported culture, though the reporting rate between two cultures is marginal
41 [9].Therefore, blame free culture needs to be fostered in the healthcare settings because early
42 reporting of medical incidents including medication error is associated with patient safety,
43 learning of causes and their remediation and prevention [11]. In fact, MEs and adverse events
44 using multimodal approach [12]can be reduced considerably leading to cost reduction and
45 substantial decrease in morbidity, mortality, and disabilities around the world [11].Multiple
46 factors lead to the occurrence of MEs [12, 13]. Healthcare providers need to know prohibited
47 abbreviations and should never use them in their practice as these are frequently linked with
48 MEs, and avoidance of their useoften lead to enhanced patient safety and quality of care
49 [6,7,11,13]. Similarly, prescribers need to handle look-alike and sound-alike (LASA) and high
50 alert medications (HAM) drugs carefully, because they are the major cause of MEs [6-8,11-13].
51 Medication management system needs to be error free including processes and behaviours that
52 determine the way that medications are safely used or handled by patients[6-8,12,13]. Safe
53 medication management, a critical component of healthcare system guarantees patient safety and
54 quality of life[14]. Notably, appropriate medication prescribing, dispensing, administration, and
55 proper use of prescribed medications by patients contribute substantially to an environment
56 associated with low incidence ofMEs [14].Furthermore, consideration of patients' perceptions
57 about safe medication management while planning annual action plan of medication safe use
58 contribute considerably to enhance patient safety issues, quality of care and enhanced
59 satisfaction both of healthcare providers and users[11,14].Medication errors are the major

60 concern of health professionals, patient and public and need to be prevented in healthcare
61 organizations using powerful tools such as root cause analysis.

62 **The root causes analysis is one of the elements of risk management strategies [15]. Prior to**
63 **RCA, multidisciplinary team considers what criteria should be used to find out factors causing**
64 **ME (or performance variance) and the impact of their differential (or performance) reporting by**
65 **professionals. In addition, the team looks for reasons underlying variable reporting of MEs and**
66 **recommends remedial measures. In KSMC, the team forwards the recommendations to the**
67 **hospital manager who decides about the best action to be taken against defaulters of ME**
68 **reporting and ME makers.** RCA has several critical steps [Figure 1] and is an in-depth process for
69 identifying the most basic factor(s) underlying a variation in performance, such as detection and
70 reporting of medication errors, and the focus is on systems and processes but not on individuals
71 [15-18]. In other words, RCT reflects a process of determining the causes of active and latent
72 errors [19] that led to a nonconformance, event or undesirable condition. RCT identifies
73 corrective actions to prevent recurrence of events which, when solved restores the status quo or
74 establishes a desired effect. The Joint Commission (JC) Root Cause Analysis and Action Plan
75 tool has 24 analysis questions that facilitate RCA in finding the main cause of the problem [20].
76 Furthermore, RCA is a retrospective, structured method and involves thorough review of the
77 problem/error in order to identify and verify the underlying prime cause of ME or symptoms [19,
78 21]. Thus, identified root causes are controlled by risk management team by specifying workable
79 corrective measures, and allow for the generation of charts, recommendations and their
80 implementation. RCA is carried out in case of significant or consequential events, occurrence of
81 repetitive human errors and system failures during a specific process, and low performance
82 contrary to desired quality standards. RCA prevents problems from recurring, reduces possible
83 injury to personnel, increases competitiveness and efficiency, promotes customers safety and
84 outcome, improves communication about patient care, team work and stability of profession, and
85 reduces cost [22]. According to some researchers, a thorough understanding of RCA is a key
86 component in promoting safety within the healthcare setting, and risk reduction strategies make
87 RCA more meaningful and efficient that impact safety of healthcare systems [23]. Several RCA-
88 related tools useful in healthcare settings are identified and those are "five whys" approach,
89 cause-and-effect diagrams (Ishikawa), causal tree mapping, affinity diagrams, interrelationship
90 diagram, and Pareto charts and other tools [16, 18].




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92 **Figure 1: The Critical steps of RCA adapted from [17].**

93 Root cause is a harmful factor that results in the production of problem/adverse outcome
 94 in business organizations including health industry. Root cause is usually used to describe the
 95 depth in the causal chain where an intervention could reasonably be implemented to improve
 96 performance or prevent an undesirable outcome [24]. These adverse events/outcomes may result
 97 from medication errors or near misses/close calls or medicinal incidents. Causes or causal factors
 98 determine a condition or event that results in an effect reflecting cause-effect relationship [25]. In
 99 RCA, one should always see beyond obvious [Figure 2] and the initial response is usually the
 100 symptom, not the root cause of the problem [26]. To fix a problem, it must be clearly defined and
 101 corrected by using RCA tools which are very useful and productive. Doggett (2004) compared
 102 **three** tools, the cause-and-effect diagram (CED), the interrelationship diagram (ID), and the
 103 current reality tree (CRT) to find out the differences but could not find the best tool among
 104 them [24]. Most times root cause turns out to be much more than expected such as: process or
 105 program failure, system or organization failure, poorly written work instructions including
 106 illegible prescriptions, and lack of training and others [27,28]. In an editorial, Vincent (2004)
 107 criticized RCA based on its notion of single root cause and instead used the term system
 108 analysis [28].

109



110

111 **Figure 2 Root Cause Analysis – obvious and beyond obvious causes [26].**

112

113 The rationale of this minireview is to familiarize health professionals with medication
114 errors, related programs, policies, procedures, action plan, and RCT. The RCA is routinely
115 conducted in King Saud Medical City; however, a discussion with local pharmacists revealed
116 knowledge gap about RCT, which is not used in most other general hospitals in Saudi Arabia.
117 The significance of this study is that MEs are a major cause of morbidity and mortality, burden
118 on public health, and are associated with a variety of adverse consequences around the world.
119 MEs are caused by multiple factors and RCT is a powerful tool to detect the prime cause of ME.
120 Based on identified factors in individual MEs, preventive strategies and action plan are
121 developed for implementation. The overall purpose is to prevent the occurrence of new and
122 recurrence of old MEs in healthcare settings. Other healthcare organizations may adopt the
123 process of conducting RCA in order to identify the root causes of ME and, accordingly, develop
124 preventive strategies and recommendations for implementation that could lead to reduction in
125 MEs [10, 14, 20]. The objective of this review narratively describes the medication errors and
126 steps of root causes analysis in light of emerging views and practices in KSMC, and supported
127 by international data.


128 **Methods and Results**

129

130 **Search Method**

131 The relevant literature published in English since the year 2007 was searched in PubMed
132 and Google Scholar databases. The Boolean operators and keywords used in multiple electronic
133 searches were medication errors in hospitals “AND” root cause analysis OR RCA tools, “AND”

134 adverse effects of MEs OR disadvantages of RCA "AND" prevention of MEs by RCA. The
135 search strategy and the keywords were modified as appropriate according to the searched
136 database. In addition, the studies listed in relevant articles were hand searched. More than 12400
137 articles (n=11025) were retrieved, which were reviewed by two independent reviewers (NAQ
138 &DSAD). Our main focus was on full articles describing MEs and RCA in healthcare
139 organizations. After removal of duplications [n=7241], no full articles [n=1203], no abstracts
140 [n=721], non-English articles [n=161], and not accessible papers [n=1601], only 98 papers were
141 left for further review. Finally both reviewers agreed to include 53 published studies in this
142 minireview [Figure 3 Prisma Chart].



166

Figure 3 Prisma Chart

Setting

168 King Saud Medical City is a tertiary care and referral hospital in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
169 This medical city has 1400 bed capacity and comprises of general, pediatric and maternity
170 hospitals. It also has intensive care unit (ICU), artificial kidney unit (AKU), human
171 immunodeficiency virus (HIV) centre and dental clinics. The campaign for safe medication
172 management and patient safety in KSMC was formally started in January 2012. Pharmaceutical
173 care staff carried out SWOT (strength, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) [29]analysis
174 of pharmacy services in KSMC for suggesting some reforms. This exercise was designed to help
175 healthcare professionals to identify potential risks to medication safety, prevent medication
176 errors, regularly conduct root cause analysis, ensure patient safety, and improving overall quality
177 of healthcare. Medication Safety Coordinators [MSCs] especially pharmacists from Pharmacy
178 Department and Drug Poisoning and Information Center (DPIC) used relevant materials and tools
179 to pinpoint specific system weaknesses in terms of lack of awareness campaigns about electronic
180 prescribing system, barriers against error reporting, medication errors makers and interceptors,
181 and the role of health information technology (HIT) in the medication-use processes in order to
182 provide a starting platform for organizational improvements. The newly formed team started
183 initiatives to improve medication safety by collaborative approach [30] based on multidisciplinary
184 stakeholders including physicians, nurses, pharmacists, managers, and healthcare users. Baseline
185 assessment of pharmacy practices helped to safely manage medication at KSMC [14]. Notably,
186 medication therapy management service model 2.0 have five core elements in version 1.0
187 including medication therapy review, a personal medication record [PMR], a medication-related
188 action plan [MAP], intervention and referral, and documentation and follow-up with redesigning
189 of the PMR and MAP to be more patient friendly, effective, and efficient for patients to use in
190 medication self-management [30]. The important thing about this model is that it is equally
191 applicable to all hospital pharmacies.

192 The pharmacy team, drug information and poisoning center workers and administrators
193 developed a step-wise process for reporting trend of MEs and near misses (NMs) in KSMC [6-
194 8,14]. The salient feature of this system includes voluntary reporting of MEs to medication safety
195 unit (MSU) in a blame free culture that consequently leads to safe management of medications


196 [Figure 3]. For this purpose, a special medication error/near misses (ME/NMs) reporting
197 template was developed and available in all departments of KSMC. In addition, medication
198 safety unit regularly collect data related to MEs and NMs from pharmacy and inpatient care
199 units[6,7,14]. The data are analyzed monthly with a focus on knowing the epidemiological
200 pattern, and stages and settings involved in MEs or NMs for further improving MEs scenario.
201 Following root cause analysis of each medication error, an action plan is developed and executed
202 to prevent the occurrence of MEs, and NMs or close calls (CCs) across multiple stages of drug
203 dispensing[14]. In addition, the concerned professionals collaboratively develop educational
204 posters to demonstrate the trend in MEs and NMs. This is to share important drug information
205 among all healthcare providers for further improving medication management, reduction in MEs
206 and enhancing patient safety. Every reported ME is investigated by a multidisciplinary team that
207 uses RCA for identifying main cause of ME. Furthermore, for dissemination purpose research
208 team from KSMC published a number of papers on MEs and NMs or Close Calls in open access
209 international journals [6-8, 10,14].

210 **Conceptual Framework of MEs**

211 Medication error reporting informs about epidemiological trend of MEs and helps in
212 tailoring safe medication management plan. The development of conceptual framework for
213 identifying risk factors for medication error should consider the following; error producing
214 conditions; likelihood of error occurring; environment including setting and processes of care;
215 medication(s) involved; stage of medication process; patient characteristic(s); nature
216 (seriousness) and type of error; contributing factors; mitigating and ameliorating factors; patient
217 outcome; and pharmacovigilance system [31, 32,33]. However, any or all characteristics of a
218 drug product can increase or decrease risk, and should be considered in risk assessment: generic
219 name, brand name; dose, strength(s), dose form, packaging, labeling; route, frequency,
220 instructions; storage requirements; indications and patient's demographic; care environment and
221 others. Medication errors occur in predictable ways to allow risk assessment, risk reduction and
222 error prevention. Notably, the error prevention strategies include but are not limited to patient
223 education, prior authorization, electronic technology including bar coding, electronic prescription
224 record, e-prescribing, electronic drug utilization reviews, automated medication dispensing, and
225 internal quality control procedures[34]. Similarly, drug product interacts with healthcare

226 environment and system processes in identifiable but often surprising and predictable fashion.
 227 These interactions are determined by specific characteristics of the product and specific
 228 healthcare processes. Medication error reporting system is an important tool in a healthcare
 229 setting. Similarly, at the national level, healthcare providers, patients and public can report
 230 medication errors to the pharmacovigilance system. ME reporting has the following steps; 1)
 231 OVAR Flow chart [Figure 4], 2) reporting and documentation, 3) analysis of MEs, 4) Root Cause
 232 analysis and 5) action plan. Root Cause analysis is an important tool of medication safety unit
 233 (MSU) in King Saud Medical City.

234



235

236 **Figure 4 ME Reporting and RCA Flow Chart**

237 **Clinical Case Scenarios of MEs**

238 1. One patient diagnosed with ischemic toe was prescribed Nexium (esomeprazole) 40 mg orally
 239 but transcribed and entered wrongly as Nexavar (sorafenib) 200 mg which is a chemotherapy
 240 drug. This was because of un-upgraded EP system, and medications are entered in formulary

241 alphabetically. It was sound-a-like error that happened last week. RCA is in progress with
242 documentation and action plan.

243 2. One patient came to ER with bronchial asthma and physician entered wrongly prendopril 5 mg
244 tablet five times/day (antihypertensive drug) instead of prednisolone 20 mg tablet once. RCA
245 was carried out and documented and action plan was considered.

246 3. A female patient with acute coronary syndrome (ACS) in surgery department was on multiple
247 beta blockers: Metoprolol 50 mg tab; Carvidelol 25 mg tab; and Bisoprolol 10 mg tab as found
248 by pharmacist on ward round, attributed to non-implementation of related medication
249 reconciliation (MR) form, the policy and procedure. RCA was done, cardiac consultant
250 discontinued first two drugs with continuation of Carvidelol and action plan included regular
251 orientation of this policy to concerned healthcare workers.

252

253 **MSU and Orientation Programs (OPs)**

254 Orientation programs address many pharmacy practice topics including MEs and RCA in
255 KSMC. These programs have been conducted monthly by professionals of MSU for new
256 employees in collaboration with academic affairs since January 2012. MSU shares with DPIC in
257 giving lectures on awareness day. There are weekly sessions for pharmacy employees and first
258 line staff. Orientation sessions both for the HAM and LASA drugs policy for all medical sections
259 are done by the members of MSU. Topics addressed by MSU during OP include but not limited
260 to unit dose system, prescribing privilege, verbal & telephone order, stat - Prn - routine orders,
261 administration time, prohibited abbreviations, high alert medications, drug recall, adverse drug
262 reactions (ADRs), home brought medications, medication dispensing stage, and medication
263 reconciliation (MR) policy & procedures. Orientation about MSU to all newly employed staff is
264 a priority and an integral part of safe medication management, patient safety and quality of
265 care. Professionals of MSU, DPIC and quality assurance unit carry out quality rounds of all
266 medical sections regularly to ensure full implementation of pharmaceutical policy & procedures.
267 Notably, the awareness of all staff of risks and medication errors through orientation programs in
268 medication system and other related perspectives such as system processes and medication

269 dispensing stages, and their ability to identify MEs and take appropriate action is vital in
270 improving patient safety and reducing harms [14,35].

271

272 **MSU and Harm Reduction Policies**

273 High alert and LASA medications (Table 1 &2) have an increased risk of causing
274 medication errors and significant harm to a patient when prescribed, dispensed, prepared and
275 administered wrongly. These medications are reported to cause most MEs, up to 15% to 29% [36,
276 37, 38]. Notably, one of the most common causes of MEs is a failure to accurately identify
277 LASA drug names [39]. Institute for Safe Medication Practices maintains a list of confused drug
278 names and also suggested strategies to deal with such medications, which are using both the
279 brand and generic names on prescriptions and labels, including the purpose of the medication on
280 the prescriptions, configuring computer selection screens to prevent look-alike names appearing
281 consecutively, and changing the appearance of look-alike product to draw the attention to their
282 dissimilarities [40]. LASA names are most commonly confused at drug storage, pharmacy, care
283 areas, automatic dispensing cabinets (ADC), floor stock, and packaging and
284 labelling [14]. Therefore, the policy followed in KSMC is that pharmacy personnel and nursing
285 staff must identify the potential HAM and outline appropriate steps to administer these
286 medications for preventing serious medication errors [14]. HAMs related MEs jeopardize the life
287 of healthcare consumers, and hence, healthcare providers should handle HAM properly.
288 Notably, “Patient Safety First” is connected to five evidence-based interventions including
289 reducing harm from high risk medicines [41], and, hence, safe medication management strategies
290 need to be in place in high risk healthcare settings including intensive care units and emergency
291 departments.

292 **Table 1 Names of common LASA medications**

| LASA Medications | |
|-------------------------|------------------------|
| Losec (Omeprazole) | Lasix (Frusemide) |
| Reminyl (Galantamine) | Amaryl (Glimepiride) |
| Diamox (Acetazolamide) | Zimox (Amoxicillin) |
| Lamisil (Terbinafen) | Lamictal (Lamotrigine) |
| Taxol (Paclitaxel) | Taxotere (Docetaxel) |
| Celebrex (Celecoxib) | Celexa (citalopram) |

| Four most common LASA drugs involved in MEs | |
|--|--|
| Sarafem® (fluoxetine hydrochloride) | Serophene®(clomiphene citrate tablets,USP) |
| Lantus® (insulin glargine [rDNA origin] inj.) | Lente® Iletin® II (insulin zinc suspension, USP purified pork) |
| Serzone® (nefazodoneHCl) | Seroquel®(quetiapine fumarate) |
| Depakote® (Divalproex Sodium) | DEPAKOTE® ER(DivalproexSodium) |

293

294 **Table 2 Names of common HAM**

| Common High Alert Medications | |
|--|-------------------------------|
| Potassium chloride (20 meg/vial) | Concentrated Electrolytes |
| Potassium phosphate (3 mol/ml) | |
| Sodium chloride (>0.9%) | |
| DOPamine(200mg/vial) | Inotropic sympathomimetic |
| DOBUTamine (200mcg) | |
| EPIneprine [(1:1000) (1:10000)] | |
| NORepineprine (2mg/ml) | |
| Heparin, Warfarin & low mol. wt heparin (ENOXaparin, DALtaparin, TINzaparin) | Anticoagulants |
| Atracurium (100mg/ml), Suxamethonium, Rocuronium, Propafol, and Pancuronium | Neuromuscular blocking agents |

295

296

297 **Root Cause Analysis Done in KSMC**

298

299 In KSMC, root cause analysis is carried out in all cases with serious to fatal injuries
300 caused by prescribed medications and this technical step is supported by other studies [15-
301 19].RCA provides multiple leads: knowledge gain; help in knowing main cause underlying fault
302 or problem or event or error; finding the best solution for not repeating the same mistake or
303 occurrence of new errors; about health system failure; trends in serious MEs, and guiding health
304 authorities and committees for taking legal actions against those who make medication errors[15-
305 21].

306 **Purpose of RCA**

307 The purpose of RCA is to analyze and record index 2 and 3 medication errors, which
308 reached thepatient and required monitoring. So this step can be taken to prevent re-occurrence of
309 such errors that would eventually lead to amedical incident.Such medication
310 errorsusuallyhappenat prescribing, dispensing and administration stage, and choice of

311 dose[42,43].A balanced prescribing can mitigate MEs to a greater extent [42,43].The several
312 steps of RCA done in KSMC are briefly described.

313 **1.Incident Report Investigation**

314 **1.0 Incident Description**

315 Three incidents were reported in KSMC at different times in year 2015. Two of them
316 were index 3 errors, one was index 2 error, and dispensing and administration stages were
317 involved. These are briefly described below:

318 **Case 1:**This patient, a case of malaria was on Artesunate. The prescribed dose to be given was
319 120mg twice daily but the patient received only 2 Amps of Artesunate but not the same as
320 recommended by physician. The pharmacist who received the order prepared and dispensed only
321 2 amps. Also the nurse who rechecked the trolley did not ask the pharmacist about the missing
322 dose. This compromised the patient because she is suffering from Malaria and was febrile till
323 next day to receive the missing dose of Artesunate.

324 **Case 2:** A female patient with psychogenic seizures was admitted to Medical Section 4 floor right
325 wing. She was on Levetracetam 500mg tab, Carbamazepine 400mg tab., Topiramate 100mg tab.,
326 Quetiapine 300mg tab.,Esomeprazole 20mg tab andCholecalciferol 5000 unit/cap. The treating
327 physician prescribed all these medications. When the prescription sent to pharmacy for dispense,
328 the medications entered as usual by pharmacist as per policy then prepared by assistant
329 pharmacist. During the preparation process, Quetiapine 300mg prepared wrongly as Quinine
330 Sulfate 300mg. It was dispensed without double check by assistant pharmacist and the nurse.
331 This event happened in the afternoon duty when one pharmacist and one assistant pharmacist
332 were there for the entire shift. The wrong medicine dispensed to the patient by the Nurse on the
333 day the patient was discharged. Two days later, the patient came to ER of KSMC, with
334 complains of vomiting, diarrhea, screaming and overwhelming anxiety. The patient was treated
335 and referred for followup at Al-Amal Mental Health Complex, because she followed
336 up psychiatric medications there.

337 **Case 3:** The third incident is about a patient for whom the physician recommended potassium
338 chloride 40meq in 500cc of normal saline/6hrs. Instead the nurse gave potassium chloride 10ml,
339 one vial IV push at once without dilution. The treating team directly reported the error. This

340 procedure compromised the patient who developed cardiac arrest, urgent ECG was done together
341 with cardiopulmonary resuscitation(CPR) and intravenous fluids were given. The patient was
342 successfully revived; however this incident entailed a series of other investigations and
343 procedures. Patient was kept in the hospital for close monitoring for 24 hours.

344 **1.1 Person Directly Involved**

345 The following persons were involved in MEs; 1) physician who prescribed the order and
346 enter it, 2) pharmacist who assigned and prepared the trolley, 3) nurse who checked the trolley,
347 [Malaria drug] 4) patient, 5) pharmacist and assistant pharmacist, 6) nurse who picked up
348 medications [Quetiapine medication], 7) two collaborating nurses, physician, and CPR team
349 [Potassium chloride HAM medication].

350 **1.2 Root Cause Analysis Team**

351 RCA multidisciplinary team comprises of the following; 1) medication safety unit officer,
352 2) pharmacist who involved in the incident,3) assistant pharmacist, 4) nurse, and 5) quality
353 representative. The team remained same in both types of errors, i.e., index 2 and index 3.

354 **1.3 Sources of Evidence**

355 The sources of information were as follows; 1) physician original order, 2) entered order-
356 print out-MediSystem, 3) patient medication chart, 4) OVAR form, 5) medication error form,
357 6)related policies and procedure and additional discharge summary (discharged patients in index
358 3 error).

359 **2. Type of Investigations Regularly Done**

360 **2.0 Method Used During the Investigation**

361 The following methods are used while conducting enquiry; 1) contributing factors
362 diagram, 2) cause and effect diagram, and 3) affinity diagram.

363 **2.1 Special Tools and Techniques Used in Root Cause Analysis**

364 1) Brainstorming- it helps generate radical solutions to medication errors, and
365 encouragesparticipating members, six to ninein numbers, to commit to solutions, because they
366 have provided input and played a role in developing them.The best approach combines

367 individual and group brainstorming. During the process, committee members ensure no criticism
 368 of ideas, and creativity is encouraged, 2) 5 whys - this technique does not involve data
 369 segmentation, hypothesis testing, and regression or other advanced statistical tools. The 5 whys
 370 approach can be completed without a data collection plan. Its benefits include help identify the
 371 root cause of a problem, determine the relationship between different root causes of a problem,
 372 and easy to complete without statistical analysis,3) Sequence Analysis [Table 3],4) **Flow**
 373 **Chart**[Figure 5]

374 **Table 3 Sequence Analysis**

| Date & time | Event or Activity | Variation | What should have happened | Recommendation |
|---------------------|--|--|---|---|
| 9/2/2015 7:45am | Physician prescribed Artesunate 120mg/twice | As per policy | | |
| | Entered by physician using computer. | As per policy | | |
| | Ordered sent to pharmacy by the Nurse who also to collect the Medication | As per policy | | |
| | Pharmacist dispensed 2 amps. Instead of 4 amps. | Pharmacist should compare the original order with the entered one. | As per policy independent double check should be done by the pharmacist, assistant pharmacist and the nurse who collected the medicine. | Recommendation to adhere to policy and procedure regarding dispensing process. For pharmacist and nurses. |
| 4/2/2015 5:15pm | Physician prescribed the medicine (Quetiapine 300mg tab) | As per policy | | |
| | Entered by physician via computer. | As per policy | | |
| | Order sent to pharmacy by Nurse to collect the medicines. | As per policy | | |
| | Pharmacist entered the order via computer. | As per policy | | |
| | Assistant pharmacist prepared the order. | As per policy | | |
| | Assistant pharmacist dispensed the prepared order. | Pharmacist did not make double check with the nurse who picked up medications. | | |
| 28.01.215 9.20pm | Physician ordered KCl 40 meq as infusion and given wrongly as IV push. | ----- | Physicians should have written complete order with infusion time. | Physicians should write complete order with infusion time with entry in the computer system |
| | Order sent to pharmacy to be entered and dispensed. | As per policy | As per policy | As per policy |
| | The order dispensed by pharmacist as per policy of | As per policy KCl vials not to be | As per policy | The KCl order should be prepared as IV by |

| | | | | |
|--|--|---|---|---|
| | HAM | kept in the unit. Labeled as HAM when it is dispensed to the Nurse. | | the IV unit pharmacy. |
| | Nurse gave the medicine as wrong dose without dilution | Given the KCl without dilution | Dilution for the KCl 40meq as per the order | Nurse should coordinate with other nurse to double check HAM for preventing errors regardless of availability of barcode or smart infusion pump |


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376 helps understand complex processes, bring together perspectives across units or departments,
377 identify breakdowns and redundancies, highlight possible interventions, and shape further
378 questioning during the root cause analysis, 5) Common Factors Check List – includes
379 dependent/outcome variable related to medication error occurred during any dispensing stage,
380 independent/exposure variables -socio-demographic characteristics of the ME maker including
381 age, educational level, year of working experience, idea of workload, shift of medication
382 administration, i.e., night time or working time, route of medication administration, time of drug
383 administration, interruption of the involved professional during medication administration such
384 as like talking phone, other staffs, attendants, and patients and age of the patient[44]., 6) Cause
385 and Effect Diagram/Fishbone Diagram/Ishikawa -the fishbone diagram helps explore all
386 potential or real causes that result in a single defect or failure or ME, and once all inputs are
387 established on the fishbone, the 5 Whys technique could be used to drill down to the root
388 causes. One drawback to the fishbone diagram is that this tool cannot tell researcher how
389 important or common a particular issue is, and problem ranking matrix solve this weakness of
390 fishbone diagram, 7) Contributing Factors Diagram – these are the modified versions of cause
391 and effect diagrams and take into account several factors related to environment (high noise
392 level), equipment and system (unavailability of automated dispensing cabinets), leadership
393 (financial constraints), communication (transcription error), people (staff working overtime) and
394 policy and procedures (double check not done by pharmacists before dispensing) and others [45].
395 , and 8) RCA Report Form Template.

396 Another RCA tool not used in KSMC is a Pareto chart/histogram used for quantifying the
397 frequency of common causes of the problem such as MEs. By quantifying the frequency, the
398 RCA team focuses on the biggest issues first. Pareto charts include specific categories along the

399 x-axis. Histograms are like Pareto charts, but instead use continuous variables along the x-
 400 axis. Histogram and Pareto analysis provides a useful representation of data that allows team
 401 members to prioritize the causes of medication errors. This analysis also helps generate
 402 alternative approaches and provides a tool for showing progress. Notably, RCA is not without
 403 problems. Peerally and colleagues (2016) have discussed many pros and cons of RCA including
 404 the questionable quality of many RCAs, their tendency to produce poor risk controls, poorly
 405 functioning feedback loops, and failure to aggregate learning across incidents and confusion
 406 about blame and responsibility[46]. The researchers recommended implementation and
 407 evaluation of risk

408



409

410

Figure 5: Flow Chart of MEs

411 controls to eliminate or minimize identified hazards need to become a more visible feature of the
 412 RCA process, and to maximize learning, lessons learnt from incidents, descriptions of
 413 implemented risk controls and their effectiveness need to be shared within and across
 414 organizations[46]. We will further describe briefly how brainstorming is done, common factors
 415 checklist is prepared, contributing factors are identified, cause-effect exercise is completed,
 416 training and education is conducted, implementations recommended, and harm reduction plan is

417 prepared annually in KSMC. Overall, our steps of conducting RCA are supported by other
418 researchers [44-46].

419 **Brainstorming**

420 The open frank discussion among RCA committee members identifies most probable
421 factors that contribute to the error, and recommended the following steps: 1) Implementation of
422 and compliance with administrative rules, regulation, policies and procedures [14], 2) electronic
423 prescribing system should be updated and all health care providers especially physicians, nurses
424 and pharmacists should be trained continuingly as how to operate medication prescribing system
425 [6-8], 3) Implementation of independent double check of ordered medication by pharmacist and
426 nurse at the time of collecting medications form the pharmacy [6,7].

427 **Common Factors Checklist**

428 This list is for identifying critical causes and contributory factors related to system and
429 medication dispensing processes: 1) **staff** - Lack of adherence to the policy of independent
430 double check, 2) mandatory for the pharmacist to re-check all doses ordered by the physician, 3)
431 Check list form should be co-signed by pharmacist and nurse, and 4) Patient medication chart
432 should be followed by the endorsed nurse (for inpatients), 2) **Process and System** -Lack of
433 implementation of double check and update of electronic prescribing and dispensing of
434 medications, 3) **Policies and Procedure**- All health care providers especially who are closely in
435 contact with the patient should double check physicians' orders and medications [6-8, 14].(
436 kindly remove numbering in this paragraph, use mainly grammar. You can use adjectives to
437 introduce each point)


438 **Contributing Factors**

439 Ideally, common factors checklist include most contributing factors related to
440 professionals involved in making MEs, process and system failures, patients, policies and
441 procedures, medications, and leadership [44-46]. In tandem with international data, contributing
442 factors to MEs are regularly identified during the process of RCA in KSMC, and these factors
443 concern staff, patients, process and system, education and training [ET], and policy and
444 procedures. However, more focus is on system and processes rather than individual, and blame
445 free culture is strongly promoted in KSMC.

446 **Fish bone Diagram**

447 It is a tool to represent the relationship between an effect (problem) and its potential
448 causes by category type and is carried out when a root cause needs to be determined. It helps
449 ensure that a balanced list of ideas have been generated during brainstorming. Fish bone diagram
450 [Figure 6] determines the real cause of the problem versus a symptom and refines brainstormed
451 ideas into more detailed causes. Cautionary note about cause and effect analysis is that it cannot
452 get past existing knowledge - must have either observed or considered that the cause produced
453 the effect in the past. So this is a retrospective exercise.

454



455

456 **Figure 6 Fish Bone Diagram equally applies to both index 2 and 3 errors.**

457 **Education and Training[ET]**

458 All concerned staffs should have regular training in safe medication management
459 especially about LASA and HAM in order to prevent medication errors, because these are the
460 medications involved in most of MEs [47,], a comprehensive lists of LASA and high alert
461 medications is available here [38,40]. It was observed that majority of the staff especially
462 pharmacist and assistant pharmacist are not present during the orientation sessions conducted by

463 MSU. This was attributed to work load and busy schedule. Similar findings were reported in a
464 review, and accordingly workload issues impact nurses' ability to attend continuing professional
465 development with multiple adverse consequences including competence to practice and job
466 satisfaction [48]. Organizational leadership plays an important role in supporting attendance at
467 continuing professional development as an investment for the future. We suggested that the
468 pharmacy administrators should arrange their release for attending orientation programs on RCA,
469 MEs, and their prevention. In addition, training of patients in safe management of medications,
470 i.e., how to use prescribed medication at home contributes to the reduction in MEs across
471 healthcare settings [49].

472

473 Ethical Considerations

474 ~~This is a minireview and does not involve any human participation, and, hence, no risk of~~
475 ~~injury. However, from ethical perspective, the identification information of six illustrative cases~~
476 ~~was anonymized, and they gave verbal consent for reporting their clinical data. Furthermore, two~~
477 ~~authors (DSAD & IAAZ) coordinated with Academic Department of KSMC and obtained~~
478 ~~permission to publish data concerning six cases.~~

479 Results

480

481 Recommendation by RCA Committee

482

483 The concerned staff must adherence fully to the policy of independent double check [50]
484 and formulary selection in order to prevent medication errors attributed mostly to LASA and
485 HAM [47]. Adherence to drug formularies tends to improve medication safety and efficiency [51].
486 Motivate the concerned staffs to attend the orientation sessions conducted by MSU to learn more
487 about independent double check and policy and procedures.

488 Risk Reduction Plan

489 The risk reduction plan is prepared by Medication Safety Unit on 4-2-2015 [Table 4]. This
490 plan mainly focusses on education and training, independent check by two trained individuals,
491 adherence to hospital drug formulary (HDF), regular update of pharmacy policy and procedures,

492 preparation of HAM carefully, update of electronic prescribing system, electronic reporting of
 493 MEs and pharmacy leaders need to give time space to their staff for attending orientation
 494 education and training programs in safe medication management.

495 **Table 4 Risk reduction plan**

| Risk Reduction Strategies | Measures of effectiveness | Targeted staff | Responsible persons | Date of implementation |
|--|---|------------------------------------|--|------------------------|
| Training orientation as how to handle independent double check for preventing MEs | Regular presentation of the orientation program | Physicians, nurses and pharmacists | Medication Safety Unit staff | Currently |
| Orientation concerning implementation of independent double check | Do | Do | Do | Done on Jan. 2015 |
| Recommendation for drug formulary selection to decrease MEs related to LASA and HAM. | Decrease in HAM & LASA MEs | Do | Pharmacy & Therapeutic Committee members | Done on Feb. 2015 |
| Medication Error policy and procedure updating | Increase in ME reporting | Do | Medication Safety Unit staff | Done on March 2015 |
| Preparation of potassium chloride doses | Ongoing | Nurses and pharmacists | IV room pharmacists | Ongoing |
| Regular system upgrading for reporting of MEs. | Increase in ME reporting | Professionals | IT staff | Done |
| Absenteeism (non-attendance) | Under recording | Legal Affairs persons | Administrative persons | Ongoing process |

496

497 **Discussion**

498 This minireview briefly highlighted the salient features of medication errors, presented
 499 clinical scenarios of medication errors and incidents, training programs and steps of conducting
 500 root cause analysis in King Saud Medical City, and these perspectives were supplemented by
 501 international data. Despite most MEs are preventable[6-8], they cause a significant morbidity and
 502 mortality, huge cost and disabilities around the world [11,12]. As majority of MEs are
 503 preventable, healthcare providers using preventive strategies including patient education [49]
 504 need to make concerted efforts to minimize their occurrence and recurrence to an acceptable,
 505 minimum rate, which is about less than 7% [14]. MSU contribute largely to safe medication
 506 management which is associated with enhanced patient safety and good quality healthcare [14].
 507 Medication safety unit follow and implement recommendations ofRCA multidisciplinary team
 508 concerning MEs,and also update strategic medication action plan every year in KSMC[14].
 509 Medication safety unit with the help of interdisciplinary team also develop medication safety
 510 program yearly which relate to prevention of harm from HAM, LASA and abbreviation related
 511 MEs and ADE, control and monitor of concentrated electrolytes, develop guidelines or

512 implementation toolkits for individual program including reporting of MEs [template available
513 upon request from DSAD], develop mechanisms for clarification and variation of orders, and
514 develop educational and training programs for concerned staff. Overall,
515 medication safety units supported by state of the art of EPS with clinical decision support system and
516 electronic medical/health record system streamlines safe medication management using its
517 programs [8,10, 14]. Furthermore, annual action plan with implementation of its
518 recommendations across all settings in KSMC also enhances patients' safety,
519 minimize the costs, patient outcomes, and help deliver better quality of care – noble goals of
520 healthcare system across the world. Interprofessional collaboration and cooperation is a key and
521 so crucial to achieve these goals including specifically educational and training of healthcare
522 professionals [52]. Another policy is that electronic prescribing system needs to be updated
523 regularly in order to reduce medication errors. It is reported that about 50 % of hand-written
524 prescription errors [like 14%] especially illegible hand writing are reduced to [7%] by electronic
525 prescribing [10].

526 Root cause analysis of index 2 and 3 medication errors as done in KSMC and supported
527 by international data helps healthcare providers to identify the causes and also help prevent MEs
528 and ultimately assist them in reducing various MEs related adverse consequences including
529 morbidity, mortality, cost burden on public health, and indirect costs in healthcare settings [15-
530 21,24]. Every medication error needs to be reported to pharmacovigilance system at national level
531 or internally to medication safety unit in hospitals. This will necessitate healthcare provider
532 change attitudes towards reporting MEs and, hence, help in their prevention [49]. Similarly,
533 every ME needs evaluation and RCA for identifying their underlying primary causes including
534 institutional, system and process factors [15-19, 49,53]. Correction of contributing causes of MEs
535 [44-46] prevents its recurrence as well as occurrence of new MEs [49]. Overall, RCA gives
536 several important leads to healthcare professionals and administrators for the prevention of
537 medication errors in healthcare system [15-21].

538 Some of them need special focus; patient education, the collection of error data and
539 analysis in the healthcare delivery process [49] as done regularly in KSMC [6-8], creation of
540 blame free culture [14], defaulters of error reporting require proper, disciplinary action, and
541 healthcare system and processes need regular update. All these preventive strategies will lead to

542 patient safety, public confidence building in healthcare organizations, reduction in MEs, good
543 outcomes, and delivery of good quality care to patient population [49]. In the words of Albert
544 Einstein, "It's impossible to solve significant problems using the same level of knowledge that
545 created them!".Therefore, we suggest that continuous education and training of healthcare
546 professionals concerning medication errors and root cause analysis need to be in place in all
547 hospitals of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.

548 In conclusion, medication errors are preventable, associated with significant morbidity
549 and mortality, burden on public health, and caused by system processes, human factors and
550 medications. Every medication error needs comprehensive analysis using several tools of root
551 cause analysis in order to identify their root causes and develop preventive strategies,medication-
552 related plan and educational programs for the prevention of medication errors in healthcare
553 organizations. This narrative minireview calls for adoption of root cause analysisby other public
554 and private hospitals in Saudi Arabia.

555 Consent

556

557 Verbal consents were given by six cases included in this work.

558

559 Ethical Approval

560

561 This mini review (confirm this, is it minireview or mini review, and it is applicable to all)
562 does not involve human participation and, hence, no risk of any injury.However, two authors
563 coordinated with the Academic Department of KSMCand obtained permission for its
564 publication.

565

566 Abbreviation List

567 ADRs – Adverse Drug reactions, AKU- Artificial Kidney Unit, ADC - Automatic Dispensing
568 Cabinet, CPR-Cardiopulmonary resuscitation, CC - Close calls, ET – Education & Training,
569 EPS - Electronic Prescribing System, HIT– health Information Technology, *HAM – High Alert
570 Medications, HIV- Human Immunodeficiency virus, HDP - Hospital Drug Formulary, ICU -
571 Intensive care unit, *ISMP – Institute of Safe Medication Practice, *JC – Joint Commission,
572 KSMC – King Saud Medical City, *LASA – Look alike and Sound alike, MAP - Medication-
573 related Action Plan,MEs - Medication errors,MR - Medication Reconciliation,MSU - Medication
574 Safety Unit,MSC - Medication SafetyCommittee,MSCs - Medication SafetyCoordinators,MUS –

575 Medication Use System, NMs - Near misses, PMR - Personal Medication Record, P&TC -
576 Pharmacy and Therapeutic Committee, RCA - Root Cause Analysis,

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