

Original Research Article

Organizational Structure and Choice of Technology: Analysis of Dual Relations

ABSTRACT

Aim: We study relations between organizational and technological aspects of production and, particularly, a role of high-ability agents.

Study design: We construct a model in which n physical resources and one informational resource (such as talented individuals, high-ability managers) are used in production process. We show that both the production function and its conjugate function, which describes spending of the informational resource, can be represented as results of choice of technologies. These two dual choice problems correspond to decisions made by two interest groups in the organization.

Methodology: Our analysis is based on a representation of the 'global' production function as a result of an optimal choice of a 'local' Leontief technology from a given technological menu.

Results: We show that if technological progress is not accompanied by organizational changes, it leads to an incompatibility: the choice of the interest groups diverges. The model is applied to analysis of the learning-by-doing process in the industrial firms and to dynamics of structural changes in a university occupying teaching and research activities.

Conclusion: If the technological progress is not accompanied by institutional changes (changes in the social technology) it leads to an incompatibility: the choices of the operatives and the minimizers diverge, and if the final decision is made by minimizers, it leads to a bottleneck role of the "non-talented" labor. The exit of this trap can consist in a continuous change of the social technology when the economy moves along the growth path.

Keywords: Economic structure, Organization, Production, Technology, Decision analysis, Education, Learning, Economic growth

1. INTRODUCTION

An important topic in the literature is the role played in production and economic growth by a few of the most talented individuals and, correspondingly, the role of the organizational structure. The role of internal organization in production was studied by [24, 31, 36, 30, 13, 4, 8, 14] and others. Hall and Jones [17] consider social infrastructure as one of determinants of economic growth. Nelson and Sampat [28] and Nelson [26] relate institutions to social technologies, which are used in production, in a definite sense, symmetrically to physical technologies. Papandreou [29] argues that "Though it is often difficult to distinguish institutional and physical constraints impinging on production and consumption sets, it is important to do so, as it provides a starting point for what can and cannot be controlled by human agency".

21 In the present paper, we study relations between organizational and technological aspects of
22 production. We develop the Lucas' [24] idea that, though the production technology exhibits constant
23 returns with respect to basic resources, such as labor and capital, the result of the use of this
24 technology depends in a nonlinear way on one more factor, 'management', in Lucas' terms.

25 We propose a model, in which *physical resources* (such as labor, physical capital, human capital of
26 workers, natural resources in use, etc.) and a separate *informational resource* are distinguished.
27 Informational resource includes talented individuals, and, in particular, high-ability managers, whilst
28 less talented assistants are one of the physical resourcesⁱ.

29 Production function is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale with respect to physical resources,
30 while the informational resource influences production in a more complex way. Lucas [24] proposed to
31 use an additional function to express the action of the informational resourceⁱⁱ. We, instead, introduce
32 a social technology function which reflects the quantity of the informational resource needed to
33 produce a product unit.

34 Our analysis is based on a representation of the 'global' production function as a result of an optimal
35 choice of a 'local' Leontief technology from a given technological menu [32, 20, 16, 25]. We show that,
36 in a symmetric way to the production function, its conjugate function related to the social technology
37 can be also represented as a result of a choice of technology from the same technological menu. We
38 interpret this pair of choice problems as decisions made by two interest groups in the organization,
39 referred as *operatives* and *minimizers*. A goal of the operatives is to maximize the output, while the
40 goal of the minimizers is to minimize the expenditure of the costly informational resource, such as the
41 number of talented individuals in the organization.

42 In the framework of the model, we study a question of *compatibility*, i.e. coincidence of the choices
43 made by the two interest groups. We find that a necessary and sufficient condition of the compatibility
44 is a full use of all resources, physical and informational. Technological progress in the model
45 transforms the technological menu and, as result, influences the compatibility. If the technological
46 progress is not accompanied by institutional changes (changes in the social technology) it leads to an
47 *incompatibility*: the choices of the operatives and the minimizers diverse, and if the final decision is
48 made by minimizers, it leads to a bottleneck role of the "non-talented" labor. The exit of this trap can
49 consist in a continuous change of the social technology when the economy moves along the growth
50 path.

51 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model and some mathematical tools
52 needed for its analysis. Section 3 defines the compatibility conditions. Section 4 deals with the
53 questions of balanced growth and incompatibility. In Sections 5 and 6 the basic model is applied,
54 correspondingly, to the learning-by-doing in industrial production and the development of a university
55 combining teaching and research activities. Section 6 concludes.

56

57

2. METHODOLOGY

The mathematical background fact, which we use, is that for any neoclassical production function $F(x)$ there exists such a set of Leontief production technologies, Λ , – a *technological menu* – that $F(x)$ is a result of optimal choice of a 'local' Leontief technology from the menu Λ . Thus, the Leontief production functions can serve as elementary "bricks" in analysis of any structures related to neoclassical production functions. The notion of technological menu was studied from different positions by Rubinov and Glover [32], Jones [20], Growiec [16], and Matveenko [25].

More precisely the basic fact concerning the representation of production function as a result of a choice problem can be formulated in the following way. Let $F(x)$ be production function defined in the space R_{++}^n , which consists of all n -dimensional vectors x with strictly positive coordinates and of the originⁱⁱⁱ. We use notation $x \succ y$ if $x_i \succ y_i$, $i=1, \dots, n$. As usually, it is assumed that $F(0) = 0$, and $F(x) \succ 0$ for $x \succ 0$. Function $F(\cdot)$ is called *increasing* if $x \succ y$ implies $F(x) \succ F(y)$. We assume that the production function $F(\cdot)$ is increasing, positively homogeneous of degree one function (*IPH function*).

Let M_1 be the unit level set of function $F(\cdot)$, i.e. $M_1 = \{x : F(x) = 1\}$. Let us define the set $\Lambda = \{l : l^{-1} \in M_1\}$, where $l^{-1} = (l_1^{-1}, \dots, l_n^{-1})$.

THEOREM 1. If $F(\cdot)$ is an IPH function then it can be represented in the following way:

$$F(x) = \max_{l \in \Lambda} \min_i l_i x_i = \min_{l \in \Lambda} \max_i l_i x_i, \quad x \in R_{++}^n.$$

Proof: see the Appendix.

In our model there are n physical resources, $i=1, 2, \dots, n$, such as labor, physical capital, human capital, natural resources in use, etc. Let a technological menu Λ consisting of Leontief technologies be given. Any Leontief technology (which defines the Leontief production function $\min_i l_i x_i$, $x \in R_{++}^n$) is considered as the vector of productivities of resources, $l = (l_1, \dots, l_n)$. Correspondingly, inputs l_i^{-1} , $i=1, \dots, n$ are needed to produce a unit of product.

There is also an *informational resource* which possesses one of the characteristic properties of public good – *non-rivalry*: a unit of the informational resource can serve simultaneously all physical resources, $i=1, 2, \dots, n$, taken in some quantities. The most talented individuals in the firm or high-ability managers are examples of such informational resource. *Social technology* is characterized by a vector $h = (h_1, \dots, h_n)$, where h_i is the minimal quantity of the informational resource needed per unit of physical resource i , $i=1, 2, \dots, n$.

88 Thus, two 'elementary' functions are defined:

89 1) *Leontief production function*, $L_l(x) = \min_i l_i x_i$, which shows the output which can be produced
90 under the Leontief technology, $l = (l_1, \dots, l_n)$, given the vector of physical resources, $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$;

91 2) *Social technology function*, $F_l^\circ(h) = \max_i h_i l_i^{-1}$, which shows the quantity of the informational
92 resource which is needed to produce a product unit under the social technology $h = (h_1, \dots, h_n)$ and
93 the Leontief production technology $l = (l_1, \dots, l_n)$.

94 Following Rubinov and Glover [32], a *conjugate function* can be defined in the following way:

$$95 \quad F^\circ(l) = \max_{x \in M_1} \min_i l_i x_i^{\text{iv}}.$$

96 The latter has an evident economic meaning: for each Leontief technology l it shows the maximal
97 output which can be received if a bundle of physical resources is taken from the set M_1 .

98 Another economic interpretation of the conjugate function, more interesting for us, will be received if
99 the function $F^\circ(\cdot)$ is represented in a similar way to how function $F(\cdot)$ is represented by Theorem 1.
100 Such representation is provided by the following theorem.

101 THEOREM 2.

$$102 \quad F^\circ(l) = \min_{x \in M_1} \max_i l_i x_i, \quad l \in R_{++}^n.$$

103 Proof: see the Appendix.

104 Let the vector of social technology, h , be an argument in the conjugate function, $F^\circ(\cdot)$. Then, by
105 Theorem 2,

$$106 \quad F^\circ(h) = \min_{x \in M_1} \max_i h_i x_i = \min_{l \in \Lambda} \max_i h_i l_i^{-1}.$$

107 This means that for each social technology, h , the conjugate function, $F^\circ(h)$, shows the minimal
108 expenditures of the informational resource needed to produce the output unit under the technological
109 menu, Λ .

110 The following theorem provides a formula for calculating conjugate functions.

111 THEOREM 3. If $F(\cdot)$ is an IPH function then

$$112 \quad F^\circ(h) = \frac{1}{F(h^{-1})}, \quad h \gg 0.$$

113 Proof: see the Appendix.

114 As an example, results of applications of Theorem 3 to Leontief, Cobb-Douglas and CES production
115 functions are collected in Table 1.

116 **Table 1.** Some production functions and their conjugate functions.

	Production function	Conjugate function
Leontief	$F(x) = \min_i l_i x_i$	$F^\circ(h) = \max_i l_i^{-1} h_i$
Cobb-Douglas	$F(x) = Ax_1^{\alpha_1} \dots x_n^{\alpha_n}$, where $A > 0$, $\alpha_i > 0$, $\sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i = 1$	$F^\circ(h) = A^{-1} h_1^{\alpha_1} \dots h_n^{\alpha_n}$
CES	$F(x) = [\alpha_1 (A_1 x_1)^p + \dots + \alpha_n (A_n x_n)^p]^{\frac{1}{p}}$, $A_i > 0$, $\alpha_i > 0$, $\sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i = 1$, $p < 1$, $p \neq 0$	$F^\circ(h) = [\alpha_1 (A_1^{-1} h_1)^{-p} + \dots + \alpha_n (A_n^{-1} h_n)^{-p}]^{-\frac{1}{p}}$

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118 3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

119 3.1. Conditions of Compatibility

120 We have come to the following pair of dual problems.

121 PROBLEM 1. Choose from the technological menu Λ such Leontief technology l , for which, given a
122 bundle of physical resources, x , the output is maximal:

$$123 \quad F(x) = \max_{l \in \Lambda} \min_i l_i x_i, \quad x \in R_{++}^n,$$

124 PROBLEM 2. Choose from the technological menu Λ such Leontief technology l , for which, given a
125 social technology, h , expenditures of the informational resource per unit of output are minimal:

$$126 \quad F^\circ(h) = \min_{l \in \Lambda} \max_i l_i^{-1} h_i, \quad h \in R_{++}^n.$$

127 These problems reflect non-coinciding interests of interest groups in a typical organization. These
128 interest groups will be referred as *operatives* and *minimizers*; and the problem 1 is solved by the
129 operatives, while the problem 2 is solved by the minimizers. A natural question is: in what case the
130 problems 1 and 2 are *compatible*, in the sense that their solutions provide the same Leontief
131 technology l^* ?

132 THEOREM 4. Problems 1 and 2 are compatible iff

$$h^{-1} = \lambda x, \text{ where } \lambda > 0. \quad (1)$$

Proof: see the Appendix.

Remind that the informational resource has a feature of public good, non-rivalry: a unit of the informational resource can serve simultaneously the volumes h_i^{-1} of physical resources $i = 1, \dots, n$. Thus, Equation (1) is a condition of the *full employment of the informational resource*. Under this condition, it is impossible to increase the use of the physical resources and the output without an increase of the expenditure of the informational resource.

Similarly, each unit of output demands expenditures of physical resources l_i^{-1} , $i = 1, \dots, n$. A condition of *full employment of physical resources* consists in the proportionality of vectors l^{-1} and x , i.e. in the equality $l^{-1} = \mu x$, where $\mu > 0$. Evidently, in the operative's solution the physical resources are always fully employed.

3.2. Technological Progress, Balanced Growth, and Incompatibility

Now, let the 'global' production function $F(x, t)$ and, correspondingly, the unit level set, $M_1(t)$, and the technological menu, $\Lambda(t)$, depend on time. A *factor-augmenting technological progress* takes place if $F(x, t) = F(A_1(t)x_1, \dots, A_n(t)x_n)$. A special case is the *Hicks-neutral technological progress* in which case $F(x, t) = A(t)F(x)$, where $A(t)$ is the total factor productivity (TFP). The homogeneity implies that the presence of the factor-augmenting technological progress is equivalent to the following equality which links the unit level sets at any two moments of time, $t_2 > t_1$:

$$M_1(t_2) = \{x : x_i = \frac{A_i(t_2)}{A_i(t_1)} x_i(t_1), i = 1, \dots, n, x(t_1) \in M_1(t_1)\}.$$

Correspondingly, for the technological menus:

$$\Lambda(t_2) = \{l : l_i = \frac{A_i(t_2)}{A_i(t_1)} l_i(t_1), i = 1, \dots, n, l(t_1) \in \Lambda(t_1)\}.$$

In particular, if $A_i(t) = \gamma_i^t A_i(0)$, then for $t > 0$:

$$M_1(t) = \{x : x_i = \gamma_i^{-t} \bar{x}_i, i = 1, \dots, n, \bar{x} \in M_1(0)\},$$

$$\Lambda(t) = \{l : l_i = \gamma_i^t \bar{l}_i, i = 1, \dots, n, \bar{l} \in \Lambda(0)\}. \quad (2)$$

In case of the Hicks-neutral technological progress,

$$M_1(t_2) = \frac{A(t_1)}{A(t_2)} M_1(t_1), \quad \Lambda(t_2) = \frac{A(t_2)}{A(t_1)} \Lambda(t_1),$$

where the multiplication of a set by a number means that each element of the set is multiplied by this number. It is important to notice that the Hicks-neutral technological progress expands the technological menu $\Lambda(t)$.

Let us consider a typical situation in the growth theory – balanced growth with labor-augmenting technological progress. Time is discrete. There are two production factors: capital, K , and labor, L ; and K , output, Y , and consumption, C grow at a common growth factor, φ , while the labor grows at a lower growth factor, $\beta < \varphi$; and there is a *labor-augmenting (Harrod-neutral) technological progress* with a growth factor $\gamma = \varphi / \beta > 1$. In such case, in (2), $\gamma_K = 1$, $\gamma_L = \gamma$; thus, each particular technology, $l(0) = (l_K(0), l_L(0)) \in \Lambda(0)$ is transformed in time in the following way:

$$l_K(t) = l_K(0) = \text{const}, \quad l_L(t) = \gamma^t l_L(0). \quad (3)$$

If initially (at period $t = 0$) the condition of full employment of physical resources is fulfilled, i.e.

$$\frac{K(0)}{L(0)} = \frac{l_L(0)}{l_K(0)} = \chi,$$

then this condition is fulfilled along the whole balanced growth path:

$$\frac{K(t)}{L(t)} = \frac{l_L(t)}{l_K(t)} = \gamma^t \chi.$$

It means that if the operative chooses initially the optimal technology $l(0) = (l_K(0), l_L(0))$, then later on the technology $l(t) = (l_K(t), l_L(t))$ is transformed according to (3).

Opposite to this, the minimizer, under an unchanged social technology, chooses an optimal path in such way that $l_K(t) / l_L(t) = \text{const}$.

Thus, the technical progress leads to an incompatibility: the minimizer's choice does not coincide with the operative's choice. Moreover, if initially the condition (1) of full employment of the informational resource is fulfilled, and the social technology does not change, then the condition (1) is violated soon: the ratio h_K / h_L is constant, while the ratio $K(t) / L(t)$ changes.

The case of two-factor Cobb-Douglas function. In case of the Cobb-Douglas production function, $\gamma^t A_0 K(t)^\alpha L(t)^{1-\alpha}$, the technological menu develops in time in the following way: $\Lambda(t) = \{(l_K, l_L) : l_K^\alpha l_L^{1-\alpha} = \gamma^t A_0\}$. Assuming that the social technology, h , is unchangeable, let us

compare the balanced growth paths (BGP) which would be chosen by the operative and by the minimizer.

The operative at time t chooses technology $l(t) = (l_K(t), l_L(t))$ which solves the system of equations:

$$\begin{cases} l_K K(t) = l_L L(t), \\ l_K^\alpha l_L^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{K(t)}{L(t)} \right)^{1-\alpha} = \gamma' A_0. \end{cases}$$

THEOREM 5. Under the decision of the operative, $\varphi = \beta \gamma^{1/(1-\alpha)}$.

Proof: see the Appendix.

If the decision is made by the **minimizer**, then technology is found as a solution of the system of equations:

$$\begin{cases} l_K h_K^{-1} = l_L h_L^{-1}, \\ l_K^\alpha l_L^{1-\alpha} = \gamma' A_0. \end{cases}$$

This implies

$$l_K(t) = \gamma' A_0 \left(\frac{h_K}{h_L} \right)^{1-\alpha}, \quad l_L(t) = \gamma' A_0 \left(\frac{h_L}{h_K} \right)^\alpha.$$

Thus, in BGP, Leontief factor productivities $l_K(t), l_L(t)$ grow at a joint constant growth factor equal to γ . Since the output is equal to $\min\{l_1(t)K(t), l_2(t)L(t)\}$, it grows at growth factor φ . Hence, the equation $\varphi = \min\{\gamma\varphi, \gamma\beta\}$ is fulfilled, which implies that $\varphi = \gamma\beta$.

Thus, under a fixed social technology, the growth rate of the economy controlled by the operative is higher than of the one controlled by the minimizer. In the latter case the labor becomes a limiter of growth.

3.3. Learning-by-Doing

The first example of application of our model relates to *learning-by-doing* - the processes of a growth of labor productivity because of accumulated experience on a firm level. Attention to such processes was attracted by Arrow [5] who provided examples of growth in labor productivity independently on investments. The first of his examples was so called *Horndal effect*⁹: the Horndal iron works in Sweden "had no new investment (and therefore presumably no significant change in its methods of production) for a period of 15 years, yet productivity (output per man-hour) rose on the average close to 2% per annum" ([5], p. 156). The second Arrow's example related to a practice of American military aircraft-building: a time of building of a frame of bomber diminished more than 2 times after each 20 built frames.

In the Arrow's examples, no equipment, no labor did change. Changes concerned only experience and skills of the workers. Probably, these changes were connected also with changes in organization

of the production process and in the use of some informational resource, such as the time of high-skilled experts and constructors of the aircraft who directed actions of the workers^{vi}. We can suppose that the learning-by-doing is closely related to a change in social technology and to improvement of organizational capital of the firm.

However, Arrow himself, despite he stressed the role of accumulated experience, improving skills, and increasing technological knowledge, in his formal model described somewhat different process which would be impossible without investments. In the Arrow's model, new knowledge was embodied in new generations of capital possessing a more perfect production function; i.e. the engine of growth in his model was improvement of the physical technology and the structure of capital, which is typical for vintage models^{vii}. A necessity to construct, for explanation of the Horndal effect, a model in which an increase in labor productivity would not be based on investments, was stressed by Sheshinski [33].

The model proposed above in our paper provides several ways to model learning-by-doing. In particular, one can assume that the technological menu, Λ , the labor, L , the capital, K , and the volume of the informational resource, H , are fixed, and the learning-by-doing consists in a change in the social technology, h . Since $F^\circ(h)$ is the minimal volume of the informational resource which ensures the output of one unit of product, the informational resource, H , would allow (under absence of restrictions from the physical side of production) to produce $H / F^\circ(h)$ units of product. The output which is possible under the production function, $F(\cdot)$, the social technology, h , and the informational resource, H , is

$$Y = \min \left\{ F(x), \frac{H}{F^\circ(h)} \right\}. \quad (4)$$

Learning-by-doing diminishes components of the vector h and, correspondingly, $F^\circ(h)$ decreases. The output, Y , increases until the second term in the R.H.S. of (4) becomes equal or greater than the first term. A further improvement of the social technology does not lead to increase in output, and only an improvement in the physical technology (a development of the technological menu, Λ) allows for a further increase in the output.

Another modeling strategy is to assume that the informational resource, H , is not fixed and that the firm is controlled by a minimizer.

Let us consider a numerical example. Let $K = 10$, $L = 100$. The technological menu is described by the equation $l_K^{1/2} l_L^{1/2} = 10$. Then the maximal output is equal to 316 and is achieved under the Leontief technology $l_K = 31.6$, $l_L = 3.16$.

253 Let the social technology be characterized by fixed expenditures of the informational resource per unit
 254 of capital, $h_K \equiv 10$, but variable expenditures per unit of labor, h_L . Let initially be $h_L(1) = 1000$, at
 255 the next period $h_L(2) = 500$, and then

$$256 \quad h_L(t+1) = (0.9)^{\Delta_t} h_L(t), \quad t = 2, 3, \dots, \quad (5)$$

257 where $\Delta_t = Y(t) - Y(t-1)$.

258

259 Such change of the social technology reflects the effect of learning and, under a decline in output, can
 260 be explained as an increase in spending of the time of high-skilled experts in a situation when the
 261 output falls.

262

263 It can be noticed that Eq. (5) implies that the social technology depends on the cumulative increment
 264 of the output:

$$265 \quad h_L(t+1) = (0.9)^{\Delta_2 + \Delta_3 + \dots + \Delta_t} h_L(2).$$

266 Such kind of dependence is close to the Arrow's idea of dependence of workers' skills on cumulative
 267 investments.

268

269 For the case when decision is made by the minimizer, the dynamics of output in dependence on time
 270 are shown in Fig. 1 by the red (unbroken) line. The blue (broken) line shows the endogenous change
 271 in parameter h_L . The output fluctuates considerably lower than the maximal possible level of 316.
 272 The reason of the low output is the "overlearning" of the workers: they learned to use the social
 273 technologies which correspond to the minimizer's criterion.




Figure 1. Dynamics of the output in case when the process of learning is described by Eq. (5) for all $t = 2, 3, \dots$

Now, let us consider another scenario: starting from the 9th period, the operatives achieve that the expense of the informational resource does not decrease so fast:

$$h_L(t+1) = (0.99)^{\Delta t} h_L(t), \quad t = 8, 9, \dots \quad (6)$$

The resulting path is presented in Fig. 2. The output now fluctuates on a level close to the maximally possible one.




Figure 2. Dynamics of the output in case when the process of learning is described by Eq. (5) under $t = 2, \dots, 7$ and by Eq. (6) under $t = 8, 9, \dots$

3.4. Structure of University

A university is one more, different of industrial firm, example of an economic system whose dynamics essentially depends on its structural organization. Two basic sides of activity of a university are teaching and research, and the latter plays an increasing role, e.g. at the end of 1990s a half of fundamental research and about 5% of patented results of R&D in US were done in the universities ([22]). In the literature these two sides of activity of university are often considered in isolation, despite success of the best universities is based on a high degree of integration and synergy of educational and research activities. Production functions are often used in analysis of educational system, but usually they reflect only the teaching activity (e.g. [19, 12, 34]). The research activity of the American universities, almost totally out of touch with their teaching activity, is studied in [1, 22].

Beside the choice of the ratio between teaching and research activities, there are two other important structural conflicts accompanying development of a modern university [2, 3]. The first is a relation between two types of workers: high-paid tenure professors and temporary partially-paid instructors; the second group holds in the modern university mostly a high teaching burden. The

second is a presence ahead of the university two groups with non-coinciding interests: professors and professional managers.

Attempts of modeling dynamics of organizational structure and developing of the university are not numerous. Del Rey [11] and De Fraja and Iossa [10] study a model of competition of two universities with teaching and research activities. Beath et al. [6] propose a model of time distribution between teaching and research (a tragic choice, by the authors' words) in dependence on financing and with account for a quality of results of these two kinds of activity. Gautier and Wauthy [15] study a distribution of efforts between teaching and research in multi-faculty and single-faculty universities.

Our model developed above, being applied to the university, can be interpreted as follows. Let the university receive a gain, Y , e.g., a reputation or a money income, defined by two 'physical resources': the number of students, x_s , and the number of research projects, x_p : $Y = F(x_s, x_p)$.

The function $F(.,.)$ is assumed to satisfy conditions of Theorem 1. Then it can be represented as

$$F(x_s, x_p) = \max_{l \in \Lambda} \min \{l_s x_s, l_p x_p\}.$$

Here Λ is a technological menu. Each 'local' Leontief technology, $l = (l_s, l_p)$, represents a way of combining teaching and research activities to achieve a gain for the university.

Beside the "physical resources", there is also an "informational resource" – high-paid tenured professors. They can simultaneously teach students and do research by use of a "social technology", $h = (h_s, h_p)$, where h_s is the average number of professors per student, and h_p is the number of professors per research project. Thus, the number of high-paid professors needed for producing a unit of the university's gain under social technology h and physical technology l is

$$\max \{h_s l_s^{-1}, h_p l_p^{-1}\}.$$

It seems natural to assume that in a short run the social technology, h , is less flexible than the physical technology, l . The Problems 1 and 2 take the following form:

PROBLEM 1'. To find a technology $l \in \Lambda$ maximizing the gain for the university.

PROBLEM 2'. To find a technology $l \in \Lambda$ minimizing the number of the high-paid professors.

The groups interested in solving these problems will be, as earlier, referred as 'operatives' and 'minimizers'. It will be assumed that an average research project demands less attention of high-paid professors than an average student: $h_s > h_p$. Let us compare two universities: a "teaching" university in which the number of student is relatively high comparably to the number of research projects: $x_s^c > x_p^c$, and a "research" university in which the number of research projects is higher: $x_s^r < x_p^r$. In the "teaching" university, if it is controlled by the operative, a technology with a low l_s and a high l_p will be chosen, which allows to increase the gain by teaching a bigger number of students and doing a relatively small number of research projects. In the "research" university controlled by the operative, vice versa, a technology with a high l_s and a low l_p will be chosen. If the

minimizer controls any of these two universities, he/she will choose a high l_s and a low l_p . Thus, in the “teaching” university a conflict between the operative and the minimizer would be sharper and a degree of incompatibility would be higher than in the “research” university.

If, by any reasons, financing increases considerably, then it is natural to expect that the control will be given to an operative. If a minimizer was in power before, then in the “research” university a structural change will be not so visible as in the “teaching” university; in the latter the share of research will considerably fall and the share of teaching will increase. Beath et al. [6], by use of a different model, also point to a possibility of a shift from a research strategy to a teaching strategy under an increase in financing.

4. CONCLUSION

In the present paper, we study relations between organizational and technological aspects of production. We propose a model, in which physical resources (such as labor, physical capital, human capital of workers, natural resources in use, etc.) and a separate informational resource are distinguished. Informational resource includes talented individuals, and, in particular, high-ability managers. In the framework of the model, we study a question of compatibility, i.e. coincidence of the choices made by the two interest groups in the organization, referred as operatives and minimizers. We show that if the technological progress is not accompanied by institutional changes (changes in the social technology) it leads to an incompatibility, and if the decision is made by minimizers, it leads to a bottleneck role of the “non-talented” labor. The exit of this trap can consist in a continuous change of the social technology when the economy moves along the growth path.

One way to interpret changes in the social technology, h , is *education of managers* (and, correspondingly, an improvement of their abilities). Under such interpretation, the results obtained above say that only an adequate human capital of managers allows the economy to entirely use possibilities provided by technological progress.

For the first time, an approach to economic growth as depending on education of managers was proposed by Nelson and Phelps [27], who claimed that “in a technologically progressive or dynamic economy, productive management is a function requiring adaptation to change and the more educated a manager is, the quicker will he be to introduce new techniques of production”. In our interpretation, educated managers (to whom a modified social technology corresponds) choose an adequate physical technology.

However, in [27] the education level of managers is a fixed parameter – it is a typical example of a model in which institutions have a quantitative (but not a structural) nature and create a one-time incentive (or an obstacle) for economic growth. The Nelson-Phelps model was developed further by [35], where the education level ensuring the growth must correspond to a growth strategy – imitation or innovation – followed by a country, and the choice of such a strategy in its turn depends on a proximity to the world technological frontier.

In our model, interpreted in such way, the educational level of managers (a social technology) must change as the economy moves along a growth path. This is entirely compatible to the Nelson-Phelps's claim that "the progressiveness of the technology has implications for the optimal capital structure in the broad sense." The 'broad sense' certainly includes the organizational structure of the firm.

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APPENDIX: PROOFS

LEMMA 1. If $F(\cdot)$ is an increasing function, homogeneous of degree $q > 0$, then

$$\min_i l_i x_i \leq F(x) = 1 \leq \max_i l_i x_i$$

for each $x \in M_1$ and $l \in \Lambda$.

Proof. Let us prove that $\min_i l_i x_i \leq 1$. Assume the opposite: $l_i x_i > 1$ for all $i = 1, \dots, n$. Then

$x > l^{-1}$. We can pick up such number $\lambda > 1$ that $x > \lambda l^{-1}$. Then $F(x) > F(\lambda l^{-1})$
 $= \lambda^q F(l^{-1}) > F(l^{-1})$ which is impossible since $x, l^{-1} \in M_1$.

The inequality $\max_i l_i x_i \geq 1$ is proved in a similar way. $\square$

Proof of Theorem 1. Each vector $x > 0$ can be represented as $x = F(x)\bar{x}$, where $\bar{x} \in M_1$.

For each $l \in \Lambda$, by Lemma 1,

$$\min_i l_i \bar{x}_i \leq F(\bar{x}) = 1.$$

This implies

$$\min_i l_i x_i = F(x) \min_i l_i \bar{x}_i \leq F(x).$$

Here the inequality is fulfilled as equality if $l = \bar{x}^{-1}$, thus the maximum is achieved:

$$\max_{l \in \Lambda} \min_i l_i x_i = F(x). \quad \square$$

Proof of Theorem 2. If $x \in M_1$, $l \in \Lambda$ then $\max_i l_i x_i \geq 1$. (Otherwise $\min_{l \in \Lambda} \max_i l_i x_i < 1$,

which contradicts to Theorem 1). Hence, for $l \in \Lambda$:

$$F^\circ(l) = 1 = \min_{x \in M_1} \max_i l_i x_i$$

(the minimum is achieved under $x = l^{-1}$), and for other l equation $F^\circ(l) = \min_{x \in M_1} \max_i l_i x_i$ still holds

because of the homogeneity. $\square$

Proof of Theorem 3.

$$F^\circ(h) = \min_{l \in \Lambda} \max_i h_i l_i^{-1} = \frac{1}{\max_{l \in \Lambda} \min_i h_i^{-1} l_i} = \frac{1}{F(h^{-1})}. \quad \square$$

Proof of Theorem 4. Necessity. Let the problems be compatible; l^* is their joint solution.

Then, solving the problems, we obtain:

$$l_1^* x_1 = l_2^* x_2 = \dots = l_n^* x_n,$$

$$l_1^* h_1^{-1} = l_2^* h_2^{-1} = \dots = l_n^* h_n^{-1},$$

which implies (1).

Sufficiency. Let $\bar{l}$ and $\hat{l}$ be solutions of the problems 1 and 2 correspondingly. Then

$$\bar{l}_1 x_1 = \bar{l}_2 x_2 = \dots = \bar{l}_n x_n = \bar{\mu},$$

$$\hat{l}_1 h_1^{-1} = \hat{l}_2 h_2^{-1} = \dots = \hat{l}_n h_n^{-1} = \hat{\mu}.$$

Equation (1) implies

$$\hat{l}^{-1} \hat{\mu} = \lambda \bar{\mu} \bar{l}^{-1}.$$

Hence, the vectors $\hat{l}$ and $\bar{l}$ are proportional, and, moreover, since they both belong the same technological menu Λ , they are equal. $\square$

Proof of Theorem 5. We find:

$$l_K(t) = \gamma' A_0 \left(\frac{L(t)}{K(t)} \right)^{1-\alpha}, \quad l_L(t) = \gamma' A_0 \left(\frac{K(t)}{L(t)} \right)^{\alpha}.$$

Thus, in BGP the Leontief productivities have constant growth factors:

$$\gamma_K = \gamma \left(\frac{\beta}{\varphi} \right)^{1-\alpha}, \quad \gamma_L = \gamma \left(\frac{\varphi}{\beta} \right)^{\alpha},$$

and

$$\gamma_K \varphi = \gamma_L \beta,$$

$$\min\{\gamma_K \varphi, \gamma_L \beta\} = \varphi.$$

The latter two equations imply $\gamma_K = 1$, $\gamma_L = \varphi / \beta$; i.e. the case of labor-augmenting technological progress takes place: the technological progress “hauls” the growth factor of the effective labor up to the growth factor of the economy. The latter is equal to $\varphi = \beta \gamma^{1/(1-\alpha)}$. $\square$

ⁱ Relation between a few talented individuals and many less-talented assistants is one of the basic points in modern organizational economics (see e.g. [4]).

ⁱⁱ Lucas [24] assumes that if $f(k, n)$ is a production function under “normal” management (where k is capital, n is labor), and the firm’s manager is endowed with a managerial talent level, x , then the firm produces $xg[f(n, k)]$ units of output, where $g(.,.)$ is an increasing, strictly concave function.

ⁱⁱⁱ Thus, except the origin, vectors with zero components are not considered as arguments of the function. This does not narrow the class of production functions itself.

^{iv} It can be checked that the conjugate function, $F^\circ(.)$ is IPH and $(F^\circ)^\circ(.) = F(.)$.

^v Horndal effect is discussed in details by economic historians - e.g. [9], ch. 3, [23].

^{vi} The use of outside managers is typical on stage of launching of new production, while for developing countries typical is a permanent use of foreign specialists paid much higher than local ones.

^{vii} Vintage models were known before Arrow's work ([18, 21]). See [7] for a recent survey of ideas related to the vintage models.