

**Response Time Improvement on one Time Password (OTP)
Technique to Prevent Replay Attack in a Radius Environment**

Abstract. This research is aimed at the modification of the Remote Access Dial in User Server (RADIUS) protocol with the one-time password (OTP) technique for the authentication environment with a captive portal to prevent replay attacks. One of the important network security measures on a campus network is the use of authentication for identification of legitimate users and one of the most widely used solution in network authentication is the RADIUS protocol. However, there are potential security vulnerabilities in the RADIUS network especially for networks using captive portal, such as the replay attack. The Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) network is simulated using the GNS3 software on a virtualized environment using Virtualbox, which comprises of the core, distribution and access levels of the network and network devices (routers and switches). An OTP generator was developed using PHP programming language for the three variants of the OTP: Time One Time Password (TOTP), Challenge Response One Time Password (CROTP) and Hash One Time Password (HOTP). Before improvement on the OTP technique using a PHP developed script, the result obtained shows the average response time for TOTP, CROTP and HOTP as 2.5s, 5.2s and 5.7s respectively, this result showed no improvement in the TOTP, CROPT and HOTP response time respectively when compared with the recommended response time of a RADIUS server in a captive portal environment which is 1000ms (Rigney, 2007). After improving the OTP technique by integrating all the variants of OTP with the RADIUS server on a single server using the simulated ABU campus network using GNS3, the result shows a significant improvement over the above results. The results obtained shows the average response time for TOTP, CROTP and HOTP as 1.3s, 2s and 1.9s. The validation, based on the developed and simulated configuration was carried out using live servers, routers and switches and the results showed improvement over the above results the average response time for TOTP, CROTP and HOTP were obtained as 0.4s, 0.9s and 0.9s respectively. This shows significant improvement in the TOTP, CROPT and HOTP respectively. The result shows the average response time is less than the recommended 1000ms for RADIUS server response time in a captive portal environment.

Keywords: Password, Hash One Time Password, Radius, Protocol

1. Introduction

The entire Ahmadu Bello University Campus Network Infrastructure runs on fiber optic technology for transmission and is built based on the Cisco standard hierarchical design standard for campus networks (core, distribution and access levels) providing high speed and redundancy. The network is built on Cisco technology using high end devices which include Cisco Catalyst 6500 series as the core switch, 4500, 3700 and 3560 series switches as distribution switches and 2960 series and gigabit small business series switches as access switches. This setup guarantees

gigabit transmission to every host on the network. The network covers all the campuses of ABU Zaria which include Samaru, Kongo, Shika and NAPRI all connected with over 60km of optical fiber cable.

The core network as in Fig.2.1 is built on the Virtual Switching System technology for high capacity using ether channel technology whereby so many fiber ports are bundled together for more bandwidth capacity on a link, all the servers are part of the core network including the authentication server. Distribution is built on Layer 3 switches the Cisco 3750G all the distribution points are connected back to the core network through a fiber link, with static addressing of point to point nodes. Dynamic routing protocol is enabled running Open Shortest Path First (OSPF), with each distribution switch used as the OSPF Area Border Router (ABR) with separate areas. The distributions also host the virtual local area network VLAN of each access layer switches.

The access layer which comprises mainly of Small Business Series switches and 2960 series switches is built on Layer 2 switching technology. Access layer devices have access to Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) services from the distribution switch to which the Access switch is connected.

Emerging campus networks are migrating from a dedicated wired LAN infrastructure to high speed hybrid campus networks that incorporates both wired as well as wireless users like the Ahmadu Bello University campus network, the challenges of securing both users and network integrity becomes more complex. One of the most effective ways of securing users access is the use a captive portal with Radius services. The implementation of RADIUS services is however bedeviled with large database overtime and this is prone to replay attacks on the network. This therefore suggests the need for multiple level of authentication on networks. One-time password (OTP) techniques are used to prevent replay attacks. There are several OTP techniques used today and this research work is aimed at analyzing and comparing three variants of the OTP namely TOTP, HOTP and CROTP in RADIUS protocol. (Amna, 2014) using the response time of each technique as the performance metric.

The aim of this paper is to prevent replay attack in RADIUS environment by improving response time of OTP. The main objectives of this research work are as follows: (1) Modeling of the ABU Zaria network using GNS3 modelling simulator. (2) Modification of the three variants of the OTP technique (TOTP, HOTP and CROTP) and selection of the best technique using the response time as the performance metric. (3) Validation of the improved authentication technique by comparing its response time with that of the standard technique.

2. Related work

This section present related work that has been done by researchers in an attempt to solve the problems pointed out in the introduction. For example, Mikko *et al.* (2004) presented the implementation of legacy user authentication into IPSec remote access scenario using the proposed Pre-IKE Credentials Provisioning Protocol (PIC). The research provided a comparison between their technique and other alternative techniques like OTP. The results of this comparison showed that the technique had good interoperability, usability and efficiency with IPSec and OTP between routers only. This technique is, however, only useful between routers and does not protect the users behind the routers. Kenneth *et al.* (2010) presented a model for the secure use of OTP in Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols; considering the idea that such protocols should be secure even if previous or

future OTP have been compromised. They have provided a generic technique for constructing secure OTP. This construction can be used with pseudo randomly generated OTP, providing greater efficiency in OTP distribution to reduce the damage of many attacks such as replay attack and spyware. This protocol provided security to OTP to prevent replay attacks on servers only but did not provide any security at the user level.

Havard *et al.* (2010) developed protocols that enabled individuals to use their mobile phones as OTP generators using a web-based service. Their phones run a Java MIDlet which communicates with a server to generate OTPs. This is an implementation of the OTP generator with web-based service and does not improve on any of the OTP techniques. Rohan *et al.* (2012) developed a proposal to improve the communication efficiency between NAS and RADIUS server by allowing the RADIUS server to communicate its state (active/dead) to NAS. Their proposal has effectively helped to improve CPU utilization in the network. The paper explained how to deal with many of server processes such as closing the session after no response from server side (wait specific time) and this helped to reduce time and reduce retransmissions. This research did not consider prevention of replay attacks in the simulation model of the interaction between NAS and RADIUS Server. Xi Yang *et al* (2012) used OTP techniques to establish "The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface" (GSS-API) security context between two communicating peers. This compared what was proposed with Kerberos and public-key technologies. While OTP techniques provided greater security for user authentication, SHA-1 algorithms for integrity message was used to enhance the security. This did not prevent replay attack but rather increased the integrity of the Kerberos, which is not a RADIUS protocol.

Hyun *et al* (2013) analyzed the problems of vulnerability of authentication mechanisms by using existing shared key authentication mechanism. CROTP and TOTP used public key infrastructure to solve it. The proposed mechanism can prevent spoofing attack in advance by authenticating user with the use of certificate information, and solved the problems of replay attack, Time synchronization and integrity by generating password though applying hash function for label L and random value R which are only used in applicable session. Also, they transferred the generated password by electronically signing with the user's private key. The process of generating private key by an individual user to compare it with the public key is a long process and difficult to achieve by users. It is also vulnerable to attacks by malware programs since the private key generated will be stored on an individual's system.

Jonghoon *et al* (2013) introduced a new protocol to assure more secure authentication. This protocol did not only prevent cloning the OTP generator, it prevented phishing attack through transaction information. The proposed protocol requires using the OTP generator equipped with keypad. Their protocol enhanced security and provided more robust authentication method than the existing ones. This research developed OTP generator with a keypad, which, however, was not meant to prevent replay attacks. Xuguang *et al* (2014) suggested a secure dynamic user authentication scheme that is based on a dynamic OTP with both time and space (location). Their schema used time synchronization to add time factor to OTP and effectively improve two-factor authentication to protect users account against various attacks such as phishing attack, replay attack, and perfect-man-in-the-middle attack. This method required more time before synchronization took place thereby keeping a user for longer time before being authenticated. This also led to the increase in response time between the RADIUS Server and the user and prevented the replay attack in RADIUS

environment. The CPU overhead for TOTP was less than that of HOTP and CROTP. The research focused mainly on the CPU overhead, algorithm speed, server response time and OTP duration, but the response time was high because of the duration of the OTP, thus this method does not solve the problem of response time in a captive portal environment, but works better in an e-commerce site. Amna *et al* (2014) considered a set of factors like preventing replay attack, CPU overhead, algorithm speed, server response time and OTP duration. After measuring these factors through an e-learning software based on apache web server, the results showed that the three OTP techniques (TOTP, HOTP and CROTP) with the e-learning software, prevented the replay attack in RADIUS environment, the CPU overhead at TOTP technique is less than the CPU overhead at HOTP and CROTP techniques. The research focused mainly on the apache web server to prevent replay attack. The apache web server does not require low response time when using RADIUS protocol. Based on this critical review of similar works, there is a need to improve on the performance of the authentication process based on the response time of at least one of the OTP techniques in a RADIUS environment with captive portal on a network. The improved technique is expected to prevent replay attacks with least response time. Having discussed that one of the greatest vulnerabilities of OTP is the response time, this research work is aim at improving the response time of OTP technique

3. The Fundamental theories

3.2.1 COMPUTER SECURITY

Computer security is to prevent attackers from achieving their objectives through unauthorized access or unauthorized use of computers and networks.

3.2.1.1 Goals of computer security

The goals of computer security can be categorized as follows (Lapiedra, 2002):

- 1) **Detection:** to detect activities that violate the security policy, detect intruders that sniff network and detect other attacks such as passive attack or active attack
- 2) **Prevention:** is ideal, because then there are no successful attacks, to prevent someone from violating security policy.
- 3) **Recovery:** to stop policy violations to assess and repair damage, ensure availability in presence of an ongoing attack and retaliation against the attacker.

2.2.1.2 Components of computer security

The components of a computer security system include (Leidigh, 2013):

- a) **Confidentiality:** Keeping data and resources secret or hidden.
- b) **Integrity:** Ensuring authorized modifications and Includes correctness and trust
- c) **Availability:** Ensuring authorized access to data and resources when desired.
- d) **Accountability:** Ensuring that an entity's action is traceable uniquely to that entity.
- e) **Security assurance:** Assurance that all four objectives are met.
- f) **Authentication:** Identity authentication (a person; organizational entity; software agent; device).

2.2.2 SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The security architecture explains the requirements that includes policies, information services, and security mechanism which are used to protect information from attackers and intruders as shown in Fig. 2.1(Rigney, 2007).




Fig. 2.1: An Illustration of Security Architecture (Rigney, 2007)

3.2.3 RADIUS PROTOCOL

The RADIUS protocol was first defined in Request for Comment (RFC) 2058, in January 1997, contains proposed standard of RADIUS protocol. Also, in January 1997 RADIUS accounting was introduced in RFC 2059, status of which is informational. Later in April 1997 these RFCs were obsoleted by RFC 2138 and RFC 2139. Then in June 2000 RFC 2865 defined RADIUS draft standard and obsoleted RFC 2138. RADIUS allows several clients to use one centralized authentication and authorization server for user authentication. User passwords transmitted to the server are encrypted and client can authenticate the server from reply. Replies are also protected from alteration. RADIUS protocol is used for user authentication and authorization and to pass configuration data between two servers. These servers are RADIUS server and Network Access Server (NAS) that acts as client for RADIUS server. NAS sends requests to RADIUS server which replies whether it denies or accepts the request and to pass configuration information concerning the request as shown in Fig. 2.2 (M'Raihi, 2011).




Fig. 2.2: RADIUS Authentication and Authorization Flow (M'Raihi, 2011)

3.2.4 AUTHENTICATION, AUTHORIZATION AND ACCOUNTING (AAA)

Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) is a framework for intelligently controlling access to computer resources, enforcing policies, auditing usage, and providing the information necessary to bill for services. These combined processes are considered important for effective network management and security (M'Raihi, 2011)

As the first process, authentication provides a way of identifying a user, typically by having the user go through a defined identification. The AAA server compares a user's authentication credentials with other user credentials stored in a database. If the credentials match, the user is granted access to the network. If the credentials are at variance, authentication fails and network access is denied.

Following authentication, a user must gain authorization for doing certain tasks. After logging into a system, for instance, the user may try to issue commands. The authorization process determines whether the user has the authority to issue such commands. Simply put, authorization is the process of enforcing policies: determining what types or qualities of activities, resources, or services a user is permitted. Usually, authorization occurs within the context of authentication. Once you have authenticated a user, they may be authorized for different type/level of access or activity (Namrata, 2013).

The final plank in the AAA framework is accounting, which measures the resources a user consumes during access. This can include the amount of system time or the amount of data a user has sent and/or received during a session. Accounting is carried out by logging of session statistics and usage information and is used for authorization control, billing, trend analysis, resource utilization, and capacity planning activities (Rigney, 2007).

Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting services are often provided by a dedicated AAA server and this process is described in Fig. 2.3




Fig. 2.3: Relationship between RADIUS and AAA (Hassel, 2003)

3.2.5 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

RADIUS protocol is used between two servers. RADIUS server is a shared authentication server that has a list of valid clients. There is a shared secret between the RADIUS server and these clients. This secret cannot be empty, but otherwise it is not defined by the protocol standard how strong it must be. It is only recommended that it is 16 octets minimum. This secret is used to authenticate the RADIUS server to the NAS and to hide the user password. For these purposes the secret is part of value that is hashed and the hash value is sent (Jaakko, 2014).

RADIUS server also has a database of users containing their passwords, possible other requirements for these users to gain access and configuration data. According to information in this database the RADIUS server accepts or rejects the request or sends a challenge to user.

RADIUS server can also act as a proxy relaying requests to other RADIUS server and to NAS. When acting as proxy RADIUS server replies messages between the NAS and other RADIUS server. There can be many RADIUS servers as proxies between the NAS and the RADIUS server that handles the authentication and authorization of the request (Jaakko, 2014).

3.2.5.1 Network access server (NAS)

The Network Access Server (NAS) acts as a client to the RADIUS server. Users call in and NAS prompts for needed authentication information, for example user name and password. The NAS then can use RADIUS server for user authentication. When doing so the NAS sends request to the RADIUS server containing attributes that have information about user that the RADIUS server needs. When sending request containing user password, the password is not sent as clear-text, instead it is encrypted (Rigney, 2007).

The captive portal also resides in the Network access server as shown in Fig. 2.4




Fig. 2.4: Captive Portal Display on ABU Zaria Network (ABU Zaria, 2015)

Captive portals have been known to have incomplete firewall rule sets. In some deployments the rule set will route DNS requests from clients to the Internet, or the provided DNS server will fulfill arbitrary DNS requests from the client. This allows a client to bypass the captive portal and access the open Internet by tunneling arbitrary traffic within DNS packets. (Jaakko, 2014)

Some captive portals may be configured to allow appropriately equipped user agents to detect the captive portal and automatically authenticate. User agents and supplemental applications can sometimes transparently bypass the display of captive portal content against the wishes of the service operator as long as they have access to correct credentials, or they may attempt to authenticate with incorrect or obsolete credentials, resulting in unintentional consequences such as accidental account locking (Etutorials, 2015).

A captive portal that uses MAC addresses to track connected devices can sometimes be circumvented by connecting via hard-wire a router that allows setting of the router MAC address. Many router firmware calls this MAC cloning. Once a computer or tablet has been authenticated to the captive portal using a valid username and valid password, the MAC address of that computer or tablet can be entered into the router which will often continue to be connected through the captive portal as it shows to have the same MAC address as the computer or tablet that was previously connected (Etutorials, 2015).

The prevalent use of captive portals is for user authentication. However captive portals are gaining increasing use on free open wireless and wired networks where instead of authenticating users, they often display a message from the provider along with the terms of use. Although the legal standing is unclear, a click through a page may display terms of use and release the provider from any liability. Institutions will often require acknowledgement of an Acceptable_use policy in addition to authentication (Rigney, 2007).

Institutions implementing Network Access Server (NAS) often use captive portals to collect machine information, to supply software assessment agents which the supplicant user must run before gaining admission to the network, to provide online assistance for self-remediation of security problems, and to inform quarantined users when their network access has been revoked.

(Jaakko, 2014)

3.2.6 PACKET FORMAT

As previously stated RADIUS uses UDP to carry its packets. One UDP datagram contains exactly one RADIUS packet. RADIUS packet consists of five different fields: Code, Identifier, Length, Authenticator and Attributes as in Fig. 2.5. Length of the entire RADIUS packet is 20 octets for the Code, Identifier, Length and Authenticator. In addition to these various numbers of Attributes can be included, and the total length of the RADIUS packet is in the Length field. (Rigney, 2007)




Fig. 2.5: RADIUS Packet Format (Rigney, 2007)

First field in RADIUS packet is the Code. It is one octet long. This field determines the type of the RADIUS packet. Originally six Code values were defined (four for authentication and authorization plus two for accounting), with two values reserved for possible use in the future. Also value 255 was reserved. Later further 26 new RADIUS packets Code values were defined by various vendors. All packets with invalid Code are not processed and no error message is sent. (Rigney, 2007)

Second field in RADIUS packet is the Identifier. The Identifier is one octet long. Purpose of this field is to match the requests and replies. The source IP address UDP port of the client is also

used for match identification. Each request must have new identifier value, if for the previous request a proper reply was received or if there is any changes in the Attributes of that request. The RADIUS server replies with the same Identifier value in the reply. (Rigney, 2007)

The Length field is third field in the RADIUS packet and it is two octets long. For all RADIUS packets have the Code, Identifier, Length and Authenticator fields, the minimum length of the RADIUS packet 20 octets and therefore the minimum value for Length is 20. Maximum value is 4096. If the RADIUS packet is longer than Length field states, all data that is outside the stated length is ignored. This is done to avoid over flows. If the RADIUS packet is longer than Length field states, the packet is not processed and no error message is sent. (Namrata, 2013)

Fourth field in RADIUS packet is the Authenticator. This field is 16 octets and the most significant octet comes first. This field is used for two security functions. It authenticates the reply from the RADIUS server to the NAS and is also used in encryption of User-Password attribute. Two different kinds of Authenticator fields are defined (Namrata, 2013).

Request Authenticator is the name of the Authenticator field in Access-Request type packets. Request Authenticator is a random number that the NAS generates in order to be able to authenticate that the reply is intended exactly for the request that the Request Authenticator was generated for. Therefore, it must be unique and unpredictable. NAS also uses Request Authenticator when encrypting User-Password attribute (Trupti, 2012).

Response Authenticator is the name of the Authenticator field in Access-Accept, Access-Reject and Access-Challenge type packets. The value of the Response Authenticator is calculated by the RADIUS server. For this calculation the RADIUS server uses the values of the Code, Identifier and Length fields of the response being made, the Request Authenticator of the request, the Attributes of the response being made and the shared secret (Trupti, 2012).

These are concatenated in this order and then MD5 hash is calculated of this concatenated string. The hash value is the response authenticator and it is expressed as follows: (Mikko, 2004)

$$\text{Response Authenticator} = \text{MD5} (\text{Code} + \text{Identifier} + \text{Length} + \text{Request Authenticator} + \text{Attributes} + \text{Shared Secret}) \quad (2.1)$$

In addition to previous four fields RADIUS packet can contain a number of attributes as shown in Fig. 2.5. RADIUS uses attributes to carry additional information such as configuration data, information about the user and service. Standard length for RADIUS attribute is three fields as shown in Fig. 2.6, but some attributes have more fields. These fields are Type, Length and Value. (Rigney, 2003)




Fig. 2.6: RADIUS Attributes (Rigney, 2007)

Table 2.1 shows some standard attributes (Hassel, 2003).

Table 2.1: Typical Standard RADIUS Attributes (Hassel, 2003)

6	Accounting Status	30	New Pin

7	Password Request	31	Terminate Session
8	Password Ack	32	Password Expired
9	Password Reject	33	Event Request
10	Accounting Message	34	Event Response
21	Resource Free Request	40	Disconnect Request
22	Resource Free Response	41	Disconnect Ack
23	Resource Query Request	42	Disconnect Nak
24	Resource Query Response	43	Change Filters Request
25	Alternate Resource Reclaim Request	44	Change Filters Ack
26	NAS Reboot Request	45	Change Filters Nak
27	NAS Reboot Response	50	IP Address Allocate
29	Next Passcode		

3.2.7 SHARED SECRETS

To strengthen security and increase transactional integrity, the RADIUS protocol uses the concept of shared secrets. Shared secrets are values generated at random that are known to both the client and the server. The shared secret is used within all operations that require hiding data and concealing values. The only technical limitation is that shared secrets must be greater than 0 in length, but the RFC recommends that the secret be at least 16 octets (Hassel, 2003).

A secret of that length is virtually impossible to crack with brute force. The same set of best practices that dictate password usage also govern the proper use of RADIUS shared secrets. Shared secrets are unique to a particular RADIUS client and server pair. For instance, if an end user subscribes to multiple Internet service providers for his dial-up access, he indirectly makes requests to multiple RADIUS servers. The shared secrets between the client NAS equipment in ISPs A, B, and C that are used to communicate with the respective RADIUS servers should not match. While some larger scale RADIUS implementations may believe that protecting transactional security by using an automated shared-secret changer is a prudent move, there is no guarantee the clients and servers can synchronize to the new shared secret at the most appropriate time. And even if it was certain that the simultaneous synchronization could occur, if there are outstanding requests to the RADIUS server and the client is busy processing, then those outstanding requests will be rejected by the server. The code below shows how the secret code is implemented in the RADIUS environment (Hassel, 2003)

```
client NAME {
    ipaddr = IPADDRESS
    secret = SECRET
}
```

3.2.8 THE VULNERABILITY OF RADIUS PROTOCOL

RADIUS consistently provides some levels of protection against sniffing and active attacks. Unfortunately, there are several vulnerabilities in RADIUS protocol that are either caused by the protocol or caused by poor client implementation such as:

- 1) **Offline dictionary attack** on RADIUS shared secret via message-authenticator attribute where attacker can attempt offline attack on any packet with a message-authenticator attribute. (Rigney, 2007)

- 2) **Online attack against the PAP password** in this attack, RADIUS servers enabling replay of request authenticator (16 octets) and identifier using PAP. Attacker can then try an online dictionary attack against the user password of 16 characters or less. (Rigney, 2007)
 - 3) **Response authenticator based shared secret attack** attacker observes a valid Access-Request packet and the associated Access-Accept or Access-Reject packet. They can launch an off-line exhaustive attack on the shared secret. The attacker can pre-compute the MD5 state and then resume the hash once for each shared secret guess. (Etutorials, 2015)
 - 4) **User-password attribute based shared secret attack**, an attacker can gain information about the shared secret and attempts to authenticate to the client with a known password.
 - 5) **User-password based password attack**, the attacker attempts firstly to authenticate to the client using a valid username, then captures the resulting Access-Request packet and determines the result of the MD5 then it's replay modified Access-Request packets, using the same request authenticator and MD5. (Etutorials, 2015)
 - 6) **DOS arising from the prediction of the request authenticator**, the attacker can predict future values of the request authenticator then create a dictionary of future request authenticator values. The attacker can then masquerade as the server and responds to the client's requests with valid looking Access-Reject packets then creating a denial of service.
 - 7) **Replay attack**: Attacker can get user password through passive eavesdropping or sniff traffic; an attacker can build a dictionary attack to find patterns and break a cipher, then replay to server with valid login. The adversary records a data transfer and replies it at any time through the network. Replay attack is a method of exploiting a captured packet or packets and resend to user that cause unexpected or unwanted behavior from the server. If the server does not detect the reused data and accepts the repeatedly transmitted packets, the attack is successful. If an attacker would come across the data from a user that is generated by the JavaScript, it would be possible to login as the user without the server noticing any difference. The data is usually gathered either by listening to the traffic or by installing malicious software on the user computer. (Florian, 2010).
- To resolve these security issues, the OTP technique was developed.

3.2.8.1 Attacker database

Database for attacker includes two tables; the first table called users table includes username of all users with their passwords that have been captured through sniffing on ports or implement malicious script. The second table is OTP table that includes Id PIN and OTP stolen from users of the system. A typical attacker database is shown in Fig. 2.7 (Gagan, 2013)




Fig. 2.7: Attacker Database (Gagan, 2013)

3.2.8.2 Replay attack components

Replay attack components are described as follows: (Tse, 2014)

1. **User:** User is a person (victim) who requests access to the system services.
2. **Captive Portal:** The System is a web page that is designed to provide services to end users.
3. **RADIUS Server:** The RADIUS server checks the user information (username and password) which is entered in the sign-in form. The RADIUS server has a database to store the user data.
4. **Authentication server (AS):** AS is responsible of the second phase in the system, after the system user enters the PIN and the generated OTP in the OTP page, the authentication server will check the secret key, PIN and last OTP and then will send a response to the system.
5. **Attacker server:** Attacker server sends malicious software script to user to listen on any request processed to system.
6. **Attacker:** Is malicious user that can sniff to network traffic and steal user data. Attack depends on the incoming requests to the server continuously without interruption.
7. **Response time:** Server Response Time is defined as the elapsed time between the end request or demand on a computer system by user and the beginning of server response. The server response time can also be defined as the length of time taken by a system to respond to an instruction by server. The response time of a RADIUS server must not be more than 1000ms (Rigney, 2007).

3.2.8.3 Replay attack architecture

The attacker server is able to capture the username and password from user within a malicious script which is recording the private information for users, then attacker server sends the username and password to attacker who is stealing and trying to authenticate username and password in the system. The attacker listens and take any information from user in each traffic over the network. Replay attack architecture is shown in Fig. 2.8 (Amna, 2014)




Fig. 2.8 : Replay Attack Architecture (Amna, 2014)

431 Table 2.2 Replay Attack Steps (Jaakko, 2014)

Step No.	Description
1.	The user enters the username and password in the login screen.
2.	The system sends user data to the RADIUS server to authenticate the user, the RADIUS server verifies the username and password and sends a response either accept or reject.
3.	Attack depends on the reception of incoming requests to the server continuously without interruption
4.	Attacker server sends malicious software script to user to listen on any request processed to system.
5.	Attacker steals data and last request, then sends these data to RADIUS Server
6.	RADIUS server receives stolen data from attacker and replays for AS.
7.	High response time on the RADIUS server results in time out but with valid credentials, which the attacker can use.
8.	AS query and verifies PIN, OTP, secret key, last OTP and response with the user is not authenticated or authenticated.

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433 3.2.9 ONE TIME PASSWORD (OTP) TECHNIQUE

434 One Time Password OTP is an instant password, in other words it is a code that changed
 435 after each use and uses it to authenticate (Sung-Jae, 2011). OTP are passwords that are
 436 only valid for a single or small number of transactions. An attacker has a smaller period of
 437 time to gain access to resources protected by such password because any previously stolen
 438 passwords will likely have become invalid. That means adding some uncertain factors in
 439 the procedure of authorization. The information transmitted over network is different, thus
 440 the security is improved (Trupti, 2012). OTP has a characteristic making it impossible to
 441 predict the next password from the current password; also they are not vulnerable to
 442 replay attacks (Gagan, 2013). OTPs avoid a number of shortcomings that are associated
 443 with traditional (static) passwords (Sung-Jae, 2011). OTP is based on a cryptographic
 444 algorithm (Himika, 2012).

$$445 \text{Cryptogram} = f(k) \quad (2.2)$$

446 Where key k is a cryptographically generated

447 Computing the cryptogram with factors makes the output random and on time, cryptographic
 448 algorithms based counter also called even and based time (e.g. seconds) with triple factor, f1:
 449 key k a cryptographic is generated, f2:T refers to time factor, f3: c refers to counter factor.
 450 While f1.i is number of factor, equation (2.1) shows a cryptographic algorithm of OTP. Fig.
 451 2.7 explains OTP generation process.

$$452 \text{Cryptogram} = f(k, C, T) \quad (2.3)$$

453 3.2.9.1 Generation OTP and distribution

454 The process of the OTP generation consists of: (Bellare, 2011)

- 455 1) Input value
- 456 2) OTP generation
- 457 3) OTP extraction
- 458 4) Time

459 The OTP generation algorithm generates an OTP value from an input value (user's strong
 460 password and secret key) as shown in Fig. 2.9. It is based on hash functions for message

digest (MD5) and uses the shared input value between the server and the OTP generator (Himika, 2012).

A time value, a counter value and a challenge value are used as the key and data of the generation algorithm. The extraction algorithm of the OTP value extracts the real OTP value from the output value of the OTP generation algorithm. (Bellare, 2011)




Fig. 2.9: OTP Generation (Xuguang, 2012)

In this research three main techniques of OTP (**TOTP**, **HOTP** and **CROTP**), are implemented and simulated on the modeled ABU network and their response time compared in order to determine the most appropriate approach to adopt and improve on the most appropriate technique.

3.2.9.2 Justification for OTP

One-time passwords are passwords that are only valid for a single or small number of transactions. This contrasts with conventional passwords which are valid for many transactions as users are reluctant to voluntarily change passwords frequently. Since OTPs are only valid for a limited number of uses, an attacker has a smaller window of time to gain access to resources guarded by such a password because any previously stolen passwords will likely have become invalid. As with traditional passwords, one-time passwords are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. By observing the OTP before it is successfully received by the authenticator, an attacker has a valid password. Because of this undesirable property, both OTPs and conventional passwords must travel securely.

3.2.9.3 Approaches for the generation of OTP

There are three major technique used for generation of OTP (Namrata, 2013)

1. TIME SYNCHRONIZATION

In this technique, both the client and server will have synchronous time clocks. In this approach time is used as a changing factor which changes every 3 minutes. The generation time must be synchronized with the authentication server time. If the authentication server and the user do not

keep the same time, then the expected OTP value won't be produced and the user authentication will fail (Namrata, 2013)

With time-synchronized OTPs, the user typically must enter the password within a certain period of time before it is considered expired and another one must be generated (Binod, 2013)

2. EVENT SYNCHRONIZATION

In this technique, both the client and server will typically have a counter value. Whenever client wants to login, it generates OTP from the counter value and any other input Personal Identifier Number (PIN) and updates the counter. User submits the generated OTP to server. Server also generates the password using the counter. If password match, the server authenticates the user and updates the counter (increment/ decrement the counter), it may happen that the counter on client and server may drift (due to passwords generated by client but not submitted, passwords submitted by client but does not reach to server due to network failure, etc.). (Namrata, 2013)

3. CHALLENGE – RESPONSE TECHNIQUE

In this technique a random number (PIN) chosen by the authentication server is sent to a user, the user enters PIN value then sends response to the server. This technique based on a challenge response. (Bellare, 2011)

3.2.9.4 Types of OTP techniques

The following are the different types of OTP techniques:

1. HASH ONE TIME PASSWORD (HOTP) TECHNIQUE

The HOTP technique is based on an increasing counter value. Both the client and server will typically have a counter value. Server generates the password to use the counter. If passwords match, the server authenticates the user and updates the counter increment/ decrement the counter), it may happen that the counter at client and server may drift (due to passwords generated by client but not submitted, or passwords submitted by client but does not reach to server due to network failure, etc.) (Sung-Jae, 2011).

In this case it will respond to server with denial service. The steps in generation of HOTP technique is shown in Table 2.3 (Bellare, 2011)

Table 2.3: Steps in Generation of HOTP Technique (Bellare, 2011)

Steps	Description
1.	The user enters the username and password in the login screen. The password should contain more than six characters.
2.	The system sends user data to the RADIUS server to authenticate the user.
3.	The RADIUS server verifies the username and password and sends a response either accept or reject.
4.	The user opens the OTP application and enters the PIN.
5.	The OTP application provides the generated OTP for the system user.
6.	The user enters the PIN and the generated OTP through the system.
7.	The system sends a request to the AS to check the last OTP, the PIN and the secret key of the system user.
8.	The AS verifies user OTP and sends a response to system either accept or reject.

HOTP: HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm

On both the client and the server, the choice of algorithm for passcode generation is essentially arbitrary, so long as it provides adequate security and can be used in a user friendly manner. The HOTP is a counter-based algorithm called HMAC-Based One Time Password (HOTP) Algorithm that is relatively easy to implement and met the necessary usability requirements. (Binod, 2013). The HOTP algorithm is based on a monotonically increasing counter value and a static symmetric key known only to the client and the server. In order to create the HOTP value, the HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm is used. Each client has a unique shared secret, typically 128 bits or 160 bits in length. The shared secret is combined with an increasing counter, also shared between the client and the server, to generate the current passcode. (Binod, 2013)

The obtained HOTP is as follows: (Himika, 2012)

$$\text{HOTP}(K, C) = \text{Truncate}(\text{HMAC} - \text{SHA} - 1(K, C)) \quad (2.4)$$

Where: Truncate represents the function that converts an HMAC-SHA-1 value into an HOTP value; and the key (K), the counter (C), and Data values are hashed high- order byte first. (Himika, 2012)

The actual HOTP algorithm is relatively simple to understand. First, a SHA-1 HMAC generator is initialized using the shared secret. Then the HMAC of the current counter, or moving factor, is computed. Next, through a process called dynamic truncation, certain bytes are extracted from the HMAC. Finally, these bytes are taken modulo 10n, where n is the number of digits desired in the passcode, to produce the current pass code. (Yeh, 2009)

In order for a client to authenticate to a server, both must generate the same passcode. Specifically, assuming that the server has already distributed the shared secret to the client, the client counter and the server counter must be synchronized. When the counters are not synchronized, a process called resynchronization must occur. The HOTP algorithm has two basic mechanisms to resynchronize the server with the client. The most straightforward method is for the client to simply send the counter value over to the server. The server would merely need to verify that the new counter is greater than the current counter. (Binod, 2013)

The second method is for the server to maintain a look-ahead window of future passcodes. If the client provides a passcode that lies within this window, the server will ask the user to generate the next passcode and send it to the server. If two consecutive passcodes match, then the server will resynchronize. The flowchart for HOTP is shown in Fig. 2.10 (Gagan, 2013)




Fig. 2.10: HOTP Flowchart (Gagan, 2013)


4. The proposed method

The methodology adopted is based on the designed, configurations, and simulations of ABU campus network to identify the response time on the three variant of OTP in a RADIUS environment using captive portal, GNS and Virtualbox simulation software's were used to configure the network devices and the installation of the Linux operating system with free RADIUS 2.0 with firewall on the virtualbox environment, the Network Access Server which provides the captive portal was also installed on the virtualbox. The proposed improved OTP techniques was also adopted with the result output showed some significant improvement on all the three variant of OTP used with the TOTP having the highest improvement on the response time both with the simulation and during validation with the active devices.

4.3 ABU CAMPUS NETWORK MODELING AND SIMULATION USING GNS3

ABU campus network (as shown in Fig. 3.1) was simulated in GNS3 simulation environment. The routers in the topology were configured to run using Mikrotik router operating system to simulate the real live ABU network design and configuration. The authentication server uses Ubuntu server 14.0 with firewall and FreeRadius2 installed on it, the three OTP variant will also be implemented on this server together with the OTP generator. While the windows machine is used as the user's machine which are connected to the virtualbox using the GNS3 simulator.

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614
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Fig. 3.1: ABU Network M

using GNS3

odel

4.4 RADIUS SERVER ENVIRONMENT

The RADIUS Server environment for this system was prepared through a set of steps. These steps are shown as follows:

- 1) Ubuntu Linux operating system version 14 is used for the installation of Freeradius2 and the developed OTP generators. As Linux grows in terms of value to running critical applications, the need to manage Linux environments to high standards of service quality, availability, security, and performance becomes an essential requirement for success. The operating system is installed on the kernel based virtual machine.
- 2) The virtual machine (VM) with the Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) software that is built into the operating system was created. The Oracle VM Virtualbox is a server virtualization based on multi operating system.
- 3) The freeRADIUS2 is installed and use putty.exe configuration tool to open sessions as shown in Fig. 3.2 on type to be SSH on port 22. SSH is a secure shell against eavesdropping and encrypt data during traffic.
- 4) The Freeradius2 was installed together with the MySQL server. The MySQL server stores all the usernames and passwords for the users, also the logs for the response time will be stored in MySQL database, the database can be accessed via either command line tool using putty or the graphical user interface using Phpmyadmin.




Fig. 3.2: Putty SSh Client

To run the RADIUS server, enter the user name and password for RADIUS and then type the command “*radiusd -x*” as shown in Fig. 3.3.

```
root@OTP:~  
login as: root  
root@192.168.149.128's password:  
Last login: Thu Sep 26 08:26:28 2013  
[root@OTP ~]# radiusd -X  
FreeRADIUS Version 2.1.12, for host x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu,
```

Fig. 3.3: Accessing RADIUS Server

Thus, the RADIUS server will display a ready to process any request from the user as shown in Fig. 3.4.

```
Listening on proxy address * port 1814  
Ready to process requests.
```

Fig. 3.4: Running RADIUS Server

4.5 CAPTIVE PORTAL IMPLEMENTATION

The captive portal was implemented on the Network Access Server (NAS) which also resides on the Ubuntu Linux server, the captive portal is developed using the PHP programming language, the captive portal is the screen that appears when a user access resources on the network, it consists of fields such as the login, password, self-registration, drop down button to select different types of OTP technique. Fig. 3.5 shows the developed page for user authentication. This page is similar to the captive portal in Fig. 2.4 with the improved version of the page, there is now additional field for OTP technique and self-registration which are missing on the current ABU network captive portal.




Fig.3.5: Captive Portal

4.6 OTP GENERATION SCENARIOS

This sub-section describes the OTP generation scenario to show how the user OTP is generated through OTP application. The OTP application is developed using a PHP developed script. After the user is authenticated (sign-in process) by RADIUS server, the system transmits the user to the OTP page which is an important page in the login process in the captive portal. The user must open the OTP application and enter the PIN and then get the OTP which is generated by one of the three OTP variants. Finally, the user takes the OTP and enters the PIN and OTP in the OTP page of the system. After that the user can login to the system if the matching process is verified and certified ok by the authentication server. Figs. 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 show the developed OTP application for the generation of OTP for the three variants of OTP techniques, using the algorithm for each technique. The source code for the developed OTP application is shown in [Appendix I](#).




Fig. 3.6: Developed HOTP Generator

```

*WELCOME TO DEPT. OF ELCECT. AND COMP. ENG. ABU ZARIA OTP Generator*
*      Token Successfully Generated      *
*****
*
*      Method:   CR      *
*      Token:    657398  *
*
*****

```

Fig. 3.7: Developed CROTP Generator

```

*WELCOME TO DEPT. OF ELCECT. AND COMP. ENG. ABU ZARIA OTP Generator*
*      Token Successfully Generated      *
*****
*
*      Method:   TOTP    *
*      Token:    499017  *
*
*      Token is Valid for 3 Min *
*****

```

Fig. 3.8: Developed TOTP Generator.

4.7 OBTAINING USERNAMES, PIN AND OTP

The user can register self on the server from the captive portal, then prompt the user to select desired PIN, then the user will generate the desires OTP from the three techniques using the developed OTP generator as shown in Fig. 3.5

4.8 USER LOGIN SCENARIO

The user login scenario offers a set of cases for login process in the RADIUS server. In table 3.1, each case passes the system user in several stages in order to login to the network. These cases are mentioned as follows:

Case 1: The valid user

- A user login to the network by providing username and password.
- The RADIUS server sends a response accepting the credentials.
- The system redirects the user to OTP page, the user provides PIN and OTP.
- The system sends the PIN and OTP to authentication server (AS) which checks PIN, last OTP and secret key and then AS sends an acceptance response to the system.
- The authentication result in this case is successful and the user can login to network.

Case 2: The missing user name

- A user attempts to login to the network without providing username.
- The RADIUS server sends a rejection response.
- The system prevents this user from login to the network.

Case 3: Invalid password

- A user login to the system by providing valid username and invalid password.
- The RADIUS server sends a rejection response.
- The system does not response to user

Case 4: Invalid OTP

- A user login to the network by providing username and password.
- The RADIUS server sends a response accepting the credentials.
- The system redirects the user to the OTP page, the user provides valid PIN and invalid OTP.

- d) The system sends the PIN and the invalid OTP to AS which verifies PIN, last OTP and secret key and then AS sends a rejection response.
- e) The authentication result of this case is failed.

Case 5: Invalid PIN

- a) A user login to the server by providing valid username and password.
- b) The RADIUS server sends a response accepting the credentials
- c) The system redirects the user the OTP page, and the user enters invalid PIN and valid OTP.
- d) The system sends the PIN and the OTP to AS which verifies PIN, last OTP and secret key and then AS sends a rejection response.
- e) The authentication result of this case failed.

The summary of the results is as shown in Table 3.1

Table 3.1: User Login Cases

<i>Cases</i>	<i>RADIUS Server</i>			<i>OTP Techniques</i>			<i>Authentication server</i>				
	<i>Authentication request</i>	<i>Username</i>	<i>Password</i>	<i>TOTP</i>	<i>HOTP</i>	<i>COTP</i>	<i>OTP</i>	<i>PIN</i>	<i>Last OTP</i>	<i>Secret key</i>	<i>Authentication Result</i>
<i>Case 1</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>			<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>S</i>
<i>Case 2</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>Na</i>	<i>Na</i>			<i>Na</i>	<i>Na</i>	<i>Na</i>	<i>Na</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Case 3</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>I</i>			<i>Na</i>	<i>Na</i>	<i>Na</i>	<i>Na</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Case 4</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>			<i>I</i>	<i>Na</i>	<i>Na</i>	<i>Na</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Case 5</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>			<i>V</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>F</i>

KEY: V: Valid information; I: Invalid information; Na: Not applicable; S: authentication successful; F: authentication failed.

4.9 THE IMPROVED OTP TECHNIQUE

After obtaining the response time for each of the three OTP variants, it can be seen that the TOTP variant had the least response time (screen shot shown in Fig. 3.9 shows the data taken during the test).

id	username	reqtime	restime	activity
1	p18900	1447419898	1447419899	TOTP
2	p18901	1447420040	1447420042	TOTP
3	p18902	1447510055	1447510056	TOTP
4	p18903	1447510225	1447510226	TOTP
5	p18904	1447510511	1447510512	TOTP
6	p18905	1447510737	1447510738	TOTP
7	p18906	1447513402	1447513403	TOTP
8	p18907	1447514101	1447514103	TOTP
9	p18908	1447514304	1447514306	TOTP
10	p18909	1447514696	1447514697	TOTP
11	p18900	1447505190	1447505193	HOTP
12	p18901	1447504833	1447504834	HOTP
13	p18902	1447505111	1447505114	HOTP
14	p18903	1447505521	1447505523	HOTP
15	p18904	1447505985	1447505986	HOTP
16	p18905	1447506645	1447506647	HOTP
17	p18906	1447507065	1447507067	HOTP
18	p18907	1447507511	1447507513	HOTP
19	p18908	1447507873	1447507874	HOTP
20	p18909	1447508422	1447508424	HOTP
21	p18900	1447570609	1447570611	CROTP
22	p18901	1447570922	1447570924	CROTP
23	p18902	1447579244	1447579245	CROTP
24	p18903	1447579535	1447579536	CROTP
25	p18904	1447579869	1447579871	CROTP
26	p18905	1447580235	1447580237	CROTP
27	p18906	1447580739	1447580741	CROTP
28	p18907	1447581432	1447581433	CROTP
29	p18908	1447581927	1447581928	CROTP
30	p18909	1447582628	1447582631	CROTP

30 rows in set (0.00 sec)

Fig. 3.9: Response Time for the Three OTP Variants

The OTP generator is merged with the RADIUS server using the PHP-developed script in order to eliminate the time taken to synchronize between the OTP generator and the RADIUS server. The improved OTP flowchart is shown in the Fig.3.10. The source code for the improved OTP technique is shown in [Appendix II](#).




Fig. 3.10: Flowchart for the improved OTP Technique

4.10 VALIDATION

The simulated ABU network environment using GNS3 was adopted and configured on a live server, using a Dell power edge server with 8GB of RAM, 500GB of Hard disk drive and 2.3Ghz processor with Linux operating system, FreeRadius 2.0 and Firewall were installed on the server. Also Mikrotik router and cisco switches were used for the validation process in ABU Zaria Data Centre. plate 3.1 show the validation setup on one of the equipment rack in the ABU Data Centre. After obtaining the response time for each of the three OTP variants, it can be seen that still the TOTP variant had the least response time (screen shot shown in Plate. 3.1 shows the data taken during the test).



Plate 3.1 Validation Setup

id	username	reqtime	restime	activity
1	p18900	1463735334	1463735334	TOTP
2	p18901	1463735711	1463735711	TOTP
3	p18902	1463736020	1463736020	TOTP
4	p18903	1463737558	1463737558	TOTP
5	p18904	1463737743	1463737743	TOTP
6	p18905	1463738712	1463738712	TOTP
7	p18906	1463739705	1463739705	TOTP
8	p18907	1463740402	1463740402	TOTP
9	p18908	1463741234	1463741234	TOTP
10	p18909	1463741629	1463741629	TOTP
11	p18900	1464080937	1464080938	HOTP
12	p18901	1464081291	1464081292	HOTP
13	p18902	1464081729	1464081729	HOTP
14	p18903	1464082154	1464082154	HOTP
15	p18904	1464082709	1464082709	HOTP
16	p18905	1464083079	1464083079	HOTP
17	p18906	1464083418	1464083419	HOTP
18	p18907	1464083917	1464083917	HOTP
19	p18908	1464084208	1464084208	HOTP
20	p18909	1464085323	1464085324	HOTP
21	p18900	1464088388	1464088389	CROTP
22	p18901	1464088788	1464088788	CROTP
23	p18902	1464089073	1464089074	CROTP
24	p18903	1464089744	1464089744	CROTP
25	p18904	1464090479	1464090479	CROTP
26	p18905	1464090913	1464090913	CROTP
27	p18906	1464091894	1464091894	CROTP
28	p18907	1464092302	1464092302	CROTP
29	p18908	1464093222	1464093222	CROTP
30	p18909	1464094031	1464094031	CROTP

Fig. 3.11 Validation for Response Time using the Three OTP Variants

5. Results and discussion

5.1 Data

The modeled ABU campus network in GNS3 modeler environment is simulated for ten users averagely to represent a response time for each user using the three variant of OTP, the average response time were taken before improving, during simulation and during the validation process.

To measure the server response time, ten different cases are offered for each of the three OTP techniques before and after improving the OTP technique. These cases show the server response time for each request by the system user. Table 4.1 shows the user request time and its response time by the server before improving the OTP technique.


The Unix time stamp is a way to track time as a running total of seconds. This count starts at the Unix Epoch on January 1st, 1970 UTC. The Unix time stamp is merely the number of seconds between a particular date and the Unix Epoch. For example, the user request time for case 1 is equal to 1447419898 as timestamp. This case is equal to 13/11/2015, 3:04:58pm as current date using a timestamp converter.

From the Table 4.1, the average response time before improving these techniques are TOTP 2.5sec., CROTP is 5.2sec. and HOTP is 5.7s. This results were obtained when the OTP generators and the RADIUS servers were separated. From these results it can be concluded that the TOTP has the least response time, while the HOTP has the highest response time. These values are higher than the recommended response time for a captive portal in a RADIUS environment which is approximately 1000ms. The response time for each variant is as shown in Figs. 4.1 - 4.3

Table 4.1: Server Response Time for Three OTP Variants

Case	Request time	Response time	Technique Type	Drift Second
1	1447419892	1447419895	TOTP	3
2	1447420040	1447420044	TOTP	4
3	1447510055	1447510056	TOTP	1
4	1447510225	1447510226	TOTP	1
5	1447510511	1447510517	TOTP	6
6	1447510737	1447510738	TOTP	1
7	1447513402	1447513404	TOTP	2
8	1447514101	1447514106	TOTP	5
9	1447514384	1447514385	TOTP	1
10	1447514696	1447514697	TOTP	1
11	1447505190	1447505196	HOTP	6
12	1447504833	1447504837	HOTP	4
13	1447505111	1447505119	HOTP	8
14	1447505521	1447505525	HOTP	4
15	1447505981	1447505988	HOTP	7
16	1447506642	1447506650	HOTP	8
17	1447507060	1447507068	HOTP	8
18	1447507511	1447507516	HOTP	5
19	1447507873	1447507878	HOTP	4
20	1447508422	1447508425	HOTP	3
21	1447578601	1447578619	CROTP	8
22	1447578922	1447578930	CROTP	8
23	1447579244	1447579246	CROTP	2
24	1447579532	1447579538	CROTP	6
25	1447579869	1447579873	CROTP	4
26	1447580235	1447580241	CROTP	6
27	1447580739	1447580744	CROTP	5
28	1447581432	1447581437	CROTP	5
29	1447581927	1447581932	CROTP	5
30	1447582628	1447582631	CROTP	3


798



799

800

Fig. 4.1: TOTP Response time



801

802

Fig. 4.2: HOTP Response Time




Fig. 4.3: CROTP Response Time

5.3 IMPROVED OTP TECHNIQUE

After the implementation of the modified OTP technique by integrating all the OTP techniques to resides in a RADIUS server rather than using the OTP generator separately for each technique. Table 4.2 shows the results for the modified techniques.

From Table 4.2 the average response time for the TOTP is 1.3s, that of CROTP is 2s and that of HOTP is 1.9s. From these results it can be concluded that the TOTP has the least response time, while the HOTP and CROTP have the highest response times. The value for the TOTP is close the recommended response time for a captive portal in a RADIUS environment which is approximately 1000ms. This delay is due to the simulation software which require a lot of processing power. The response time for each technique is shown in Figs. 4.4 - 4.6

Table 4.2: Response time for the improved OTP technique

Case	Request time	Response time	Technique Type	Drift Second
1	1447419898	1447419899	TOTP	1
2	1447420040	1447420041	TOTP	1
3	1447510055	1447510057	TOTP	2
4	1447510225	1447510226	TOTP	1
5	1447510511	1447510512	TOTP	1
6	1447510737	1447510738	TOTP	1
7	1447513402	1447513403	TOTP	1
8	1447514101	1447514103	TOTP	2
9	1447514384	1447514385	TOTP	1
10	1447514697	1447514698	TOTP	1
11	1447505190	1447505193	HOTP	3
12	1447504833	1447504835	HOTP	2
13	1447505111	1447505113	HOTP	2
14	1447505521	1447505523	HOTP	2
15	1447505985	1447505986	HOTP	1
16	1447506645	1447506648	HOTP	3
17	1447507065	1447507067	HOTP	2
18	1447507511	1447507512	HOTP	1
19	1447507873	1447507874	HOTP	1
20	1447508422	1447508424	HOTP	2

21	1447578609	1447578612	CROTP	3
22	1447578922	1447578925	CROTP	3
23	1447579244	1447579247	CROTP	3
24	1447579535	1447579536	CROTP	1
25	1447579869	1447579871	CROTP	2
26	1447580235	1447580236	CROTP	1
27	1447580739	1447580740	CROTP	1
28	1447581432	1447581434	CROTP	2
29	1447581927	1447581929	CROTP	2
30	1447582628	1447582630	CROTP	2




Fig. 4.4: Improved TOTP Response Time




Fig. 4.5: Improved HOTP Response Time




Fig. 4.6: Improved CROTP Response Time

5.4 VALIDATION

After the implementation of the improved OTP technique by integrating all the OTP techniques to resides in a RADIUS server rather than using the OTP generator separately for each technique using the live server and routers as shown in plate 3.1 for validation of the results. Table 4.3 shows the validation results for the modified techniques.

From Table 4.3 the average response time for the TOTP is 0.4s, that of CROTP is 1.0s and that of HOTP is 1.0s. From these results it can be concluded that the TOTP has the least response time, while the HOTP and CROTP have the highest response times. The response time for each technique is shown in Figs. 4.7 - 4.9

Table 4.3: Validation Results for Response Time

Case	Request time	Response time	Technique Type	Drift Second
1	1463735334	1463735336	TOTP	2
2	1463735711	1463735712	TOTP	1
3	1463736020	1463736020	TOTP	0
4	1463737558	1463737558	TOTP	0
5	1463737743	1463737743	TOTP	0
6	1463738712	1463738713	TOTP	1
7	1463739705	1463739705	TOTP	0
8	1463740402	1463740402	TOTP	0
9	1463741234	1463741234	TOTP	0
10	1463741629	1463741629	TOTP	0
11	1464080937	1464080938	HOTP	1
12	1464081291	1464081293	HOTP	2
13	1464081729	1464081730	HOTP	1
14	1464082154	1464082155	HOTP	1
15	1464082709	1464082712	HOTP	3
16	1464083079	1464083079	HOTP	0
17	1464083418	1464083419	HOTP	1
18	1464083917	1464083917	HOTP	0
19	1464084208	1464084208	HOTP	0
20	1464085323	1464085324	HOTP	1
21	1464088388	1464088391	CROTP	3
22	1464088788	1464088789	CROTP	1
23	1464089073	1464089074	CROTP	1

24	1464089744	1464089744	CROTP	0
25	1464090479	1464090479	CROTP	0
26	1464090913	1464090914	CROTP	1
27	1464091894	1464091895	CROTP	1
28	1464092302	1464092304	CROTP	2
29	1464093222	1464093222	CROTP	0
30	1464094031	1464094032	CROTP	1




Fig. 4.7: Validation TOTP Response Time




Fig. 4.8: Validation HOTP Response Time




Fig. 4.9: Validation CROTP Response Time

Nowadays, user authentication has become one of the most important issue in the security trend. RADIUS protocol provides remote services for user authentication, but there are some vulnerabilities in RADIUS protocol such as the replay attack, which this research is based on. Therefore, the significant contributions of this research work are as follows:

1. Development of an improved php-based OTP generator for the three variants of the OTP: TOTP, CROTP and HOTP, which was successfully integrated into the Linux server application.
2. The average response time obtained for TOTP, CROTP and HOTP using the improved OTP generator showed was 60%, 10% and 10% improvement compared with the response times obtained using the standard OTP generator respectively.

6. Conclusions

The RADIUS protocol with vulnerability of replay attack and the three techniques to prevent the replay attack in a RADIUS environment with captive portal is implemented. This research work is aimed at preventing a replay attack on users on a network by evaluating the three variants of OTP techniques with the aim of selecting and adopting the one that has the best response time for further improvement. Previous studies have suggested several approaches to reduce the effect of replay attack such as PKI, PSK, IPsec, session key, sets clock and OTP techniques, in order to enhance the security in RADIUS environment. From the results obtained this research work has shown the improved response time of all the OTP techniques compares with the previous result. The result obtained is lower than the recommended response time of a RADIUS server in a captive portal environment which is 1000ms. The TOTP technique is the recommended technique to adopt having the lowest response time.

Limitation: During the course of this research work, certain limitations were observed which are itemized as follows: GNS3 emulator consumes a lot of computer resources during simulation; a computer system with very high specs is required. The PHP programming debugging was a bit harder. The Virtualbox was not connecting to the GNS simulator.

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968 APPENDIX I

969 Developed OTP Generators for the three OTP techniques.

```

970
971
972 $interval = 10;
973 $ timeInUnit = floor($time/$interval);
974 $i = 0;
975 $ epoch = $timeInUnit - 18;
976 while ($i < 36) {
977 $otp = $epoch.$user->getSecret().$pin;
978 $otp = md5($otp);
979 $epoch++;
980 $i++;}
981
982 $No
983 beginning of roll =counter client .
984 $roll end =counter + MOE Function sync_OTP
985 {
986 $ Counter=Counter+1;
987 $i=0;
988 $While (i<=50)
989 $Current counter=counter client -i;
990
```

```

991     For (i=0;i<i*2;i++)
992     $Counter++;
993     $i++;
994 }
995
996 <?php
997 namespace OTPHP { /**
998  * One Time Password Generator
999  * The OTP class allow the generation of one-time
1000  * password that is described in rfc 4xxx.
1001 class OTP {
1002     /**
1003      * The base32 encoded secret key
1004      * @var string
1005      */
1006     public $secret;
1007     /**
1008      * The algorithm used for the hmac hash function
1009      * @var string
1010      */
1011     public $digest;
1012     /**
1013      * The number of digits in the one-time password
1014      * @var integer
1015      */
1016     public $digits;
1017     /**
1018      * Constructor for the OTP class
1019      * @param string $secret the secret key
1020      * @param array $opt options array can contain the
1021      * following keys :
1022      * @param integer digits : the number of digits in the one time password
1023      * @param string digest : the algorithm used for the hmac hash function
1024      * @return new OTP class.
1025      */
1026     public function __construct($secret, $opt = Array()) {
1027         $this->digits = isset($opt['digits']) ? $opt['digits'] : 6;
1028         $this->digest = isset($opt['digest']) ? $opt['digest'] : 'sha1';
1029         $this->secret = $secret;
1030     }
1031     /**
1032      * Generate a one-time password
1033      *
1034      * @param integer $input : number used to seed the hmac hash function.
1035      * This number is usually a counter (HOTP) or calculated based on the current
1036      * timestamp (see TOTP class).
1037      * @return integer the one-time password
1038      */
1039     public function generateOTP($input) {

```

```

1040
1041 $hash = hash_hmac($this->digest, $this->intToBytestring($input), $this->byteSecret());
1042 foreach(str_split($hash, 2) as $hex) { // stupid PHP has bin2hex but no hex2bin WTF
1043     $hmac[] = hexdec($hex);
1044 }
1045 $offset = $hmac[19] & 0xf;
1046 $code = ($hmac[$offset+0] & 0x7F) << 24 |
1047     ($hmac[$offset + 1] & 0xFF) << 16 |
1048     ($hmac[$offset + 2] & 0xFF) << 8 |
1049     ($hmac[$offset + 3] & 0xFF);
1050 return $code % pow(10, $this->digits);
1051 }
1052 /**
1053  * Returns the binary value of the base32 encoded secret
1054  * @access private
1055  * This method should be private but was left public for
1056  * phpunit tests to work.
1057  * @return binary secret key
1058     public function byteSecret() {
1059     return \Base32::decode($this->secret);
1060     }
1061 /**
1062  * Turns an integer in a OATH bytestring
1063  * @param integer $int
1064  * @access private
1065  * @return string bytestring
1066  */
1067 public function intToBytestring($int) {
1068     $result = Array();
1069     while($int != 0) {
1070         $result[] = chr($int & 0xFF);
1071         $int >>= 8;
1072     }
1073     return str_pad(join(array_reverse($result)), 8, "\000", STR_PAD_LEFT);
1074 }
1075 <?php
1076     require './otphp/lib/otphp.php';
1077     require './config.php';
1078     //echo $config['secret']." \n";
1079     $techniques = array('HOTP', 'TOTP', 'CR');
1080     if(isset($argv[1]) && isset($argv[2]) && in_array($argv[1], $techniques)) {
1081         $technique = $argv[1];
1082         $pin = $argv[2];
1083         if($technique == 'HOTP') {
1084             $counter = file_get_contents("./counter.conf");
1085             $hotp = new \OTPHP\HOTP($config['secret'].$pin);
1086             $token = $hotp->at($counter);
1087 echo "**WELCOME TO DEPT. OF ELCECT. AND COMP. ENG. ABU ZARIA OTP
1088 Generator*
1089             echo "*"           Token Successfully Generated           * \n";

```

```

1090             echo
1091 ***** \n";
1092             echo "*" * \n";
1093             echo "Method: ".$technique." * \n";
1094             echo "Token: ".$token." * \n";
1095             echo "*" * \n";
1096             echo
1097 ***** \n";
1098             file_put_contents("./counter.conf", (int)$counter+1);
1099         }else if($technique == 'TOTP') {
1100             $totp = new \OTPHP\TOTP($config['secret'].$pin, array('interval' =>
1101 180));
1102             $token = $totp->now();
1103
1104
1105 echo "*WELCOME TO DEPT. OF ELCECT. AND COMP. ENG. ABU ZARIA OTP
1106 Generator*
1107             echo "Token Successfully Generated * \n";
1108             echo
1109 ***** \n";
1110             echo "*" * \n";
1111             echo "Method: ".$technique." * \n";
1112             echo "Token: ".$token." * \n";
1113             echo "*" * \n";
1114             echo "Token is Valid for 3 Min * \n";
1115             echo "
1116 ***** \n";
1117         }else if($technique == 'CR') {
1118             $counter = file_get_contents("./counter.conf");
1119             $scr = new \OTPHP\HOTP($counter.$config['secret'].$pin);
1120             $token = $scr->at($counter);
1121 echo "*WELCOME TO DEPT. OF ELCECT. AND COMP. ENG. ABU ZARIA OTP
1122 Generator*
1123             echo "Token Successfully Generated * \n";
1124             echo
1125 ***** \n";
1126             echo "*" * \n";
1127             echo "Method: ".$technique." * \n";
1128             echo "Token: ".$token." * \n";
1129             echo "*" * \n";
1130             echo
1131 ***** \n";
1132             file_put_contents("./counter.conf", (int)$counter+1);
1133         }else {
1134 echo "*WELCOME TO DEPT. OF ELCECT. AND COMP. ENG. ABU ZARIA OTP
1135 Generator*
1136             echo "*" * \n";
1137             echo "Error: Use Generator as: php otpgen [technique] [pin] * \n";
1138             echo "--techniques (HOTP, TOTP, CR) * \n";
1139             echo "*" * \n";

```

```

1140         echo "
1141         ***** \n";
1142     }
1143 ?>
1144

```

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

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1159

APPENDIX II

Improved OTP Technique

```

1160
1161 <?php
1162 use Helpers\Assets;
1163 use Helpers\Url;
1164 use Helpers\Session;
1165 ?><div class="mainContainer">
1166          <h2>Radius Server OTP</h2>
1168     <?php
1169         echo Session::message('error');
1170         if(!empty(Session::get('pin'))) {
1171             echo "<p>Generate Token Using PIN: <b>".Session::pull('pin')."</b> & Technique:
1172             <b>".Session::pull('technique')."</b></p>";
1173         }else if(!empty(Session::get('technique'))) {
1174             echo             "<p>Generate             Token             Using             Technique:
1175             <b>".Session::pull('technique')."</b></p>";
1176         ?>

```

```

1177         <form action="<?php echo DIR; ?>otp" method="POST" role="form" style="max-
1178 width: 70%; margin: auto;">
1179             <div class="form-group">
1180                 <label for="pin">PIN:</label>
1181                 <input type="text" class="form-control" id="pin" name="pin"
1182 placeholder="PIN">
1183             </div>
1184             <div class="form-group">
1185                 <label for="token">Token:</label>
1186                 <input type="password" class="form-control" id="token"
1187 name="token" placeholder="Token">
1188             </div> <button type="submit" class="btn btn-default">Submit</button>
1189         </form> <br/>
1190         <p>Logged In as <?php echo Session::get('username'); ?> <a href="<?php echo DIR;
1191 ?>logout" class="btn btn-danger">Logout</a></p>
1192     </div>
1193     <?php
1194 use Helpers\Assets;
1195 use Helpers\Url;
1196 use Helpers\Session;
1197 ?> <div class="mainContainer">
1198          <h2>Radius Server Register</h2>
1200         <?php
1201         echo Session::message('error');
1202         ?>
1203         <form action="<?php echo DIR; ?>register" method="POST" role="form"
1204 style="max-width: 70%; margin: auto;">
1205             <div class="form-group">
1206                 <label for="username">Username:</label>
1207                 <input type="text" class="form-control" id="username"
1208 name="username" placeholder="Username" required>
1209             </div>
1210             <div class="form-group">
1211                 <label for="password">Password:</label>
1212                 <input type="password" class="form-control" id="password"
1213 name="password" placeholder="Password" required>
1214             </div>
1215             <div class="form-group">
1216                 <label for="technique">OTP Technique:</label>
1217                 <select class="form-control" id="technique" name="technique"
1218 required>
1219                     <option>Select One</option>
1220                     <option value="HOTP">HOTP</option>
1221                     <option value="TOTP">TOTP</option>
1222                     <option value="CR">Challenge Response</option>
1223                 </select>
1224             </div>
1225             <button type="submit" class="btn btn-default">Submit</button>
1226         </form> <br/>

```

```

1227     <p>Already have an account? <a href="<?php echo DIR; ?>" class="btn btn-
1228 danger">Login</a></p> </div>
1229 <?php
1230 use Helpers\Assets;
1231 use Helpers\Url;
1232 use Helpers\Session;
1233 ?>
1234 <div class="mainContainer">
1235     
1237     <h2>Radius Server Secret</h2>
1238     <p>Registration Successfull, your secret is : <b><?php echo
1239 Session::pull('secret'); ?></b> </p> <br/>
1240     <p><a href="<?php echo DIR; ?>" class="btn btn-primary">Login Now</a></p>
1241 </div>
1242 <?php
1243 use Helpers\Assets;
1244 use Helpers\Url;
1245 use Helpers\Session;
1246 ?>
1247 <div class="mainContainer">
1248     
1250     <h2>Radius Server Secured Page</h2>
1251     <p>This is a test secured page.</p>
1252     <br/>
1253     <p>Logged In as <?php echo Session::get('username'); ?> <a href="<?php echo DIR;
1254 ?>logout" class="btn btn-danger">Logout</a></p>
1255 # -*- text -*-
1256 ##
1257 ## clients.conf -- client configuration directives
1258 ## $Id$
1259 #####
1260 # Define RADIUS clients (usually a NAS, Access Point, etc.).
1261 # Defines a RADIUS client.
1262 '127.0.0.1' is another name for 'localhost'. It is enabled by default,
1263 # to allow testing of the server after an initial installation. If you
1264 # are not going to be permitting RADIUS queries from localhost, we suggest
1265 # that you delete, or comment out, this entry.
1266 # Each client has a "short name" that is used to distinguish it from
1267 # other clients.
1268 # In version 1.x, the string after the word "client" was the IP
1269 # address of the client. In 2.0, the IP address is configured via
1270 # the "ipaddr" or "ipv6addr" fields. For compatibility, the 1.x
1271 # format is still accepted.
1272 client localhost {
1273     # Allowed values are:
1274     #     dotted quad (1.2.3.4)
1275     #     hostname (radius.example.com)
1276     ipaddr = 127.0.0.1

```

```

1277 # OR, you can use an IPv6 address, but not both
1278 # at the same time.
1279 # ipv6addr = :: # any. ::1 == localhost
1280 #
1281 # A note on DNS: We STRONGLY recommend using IP addresses
1282 # rather than host names. Using host names means that the
1283 # server will do DNS lookups when it starts, making it
1284 # dependent on DNS. i.e. If anything goes wrong with DNS,
1285 # the server won't start!
1286 # The server also looks up the IP address from DNS once, and
1287 # only once, when it starts. If the DNS record is later
1288 # updated, the server WILL NOT see that update.
1289 # One client definition can be applied to an entire network.
1290 # e.g. 127/8 should be defined with "ipaddr = 127.0.0.0" and
1291 # "netmask = 8"
1292 # If not specified, the default netmask is 32 (i.e. /32)
1293 # We do NOT recommend using anything other than 32. There
1294 # are usually other, better ways to achieve the same goal.
1295 # Using netmasks of other than 32 can cause security issues.
1296 # You can specify overlapping networks (127/8 and 127.0/16)
1297 # In that case, the smallest possible network will be used
1298 # as the "best match" for the client.
1299 # Clients can also be defined dynamically at run time, based
1300 # on any criteria. e.g. SQL lookups, keying off of NAS-Identifier,
1301 # etc.
1302 # See raddb/sites-available/dynamic-clients for details.
1303 netmask = 32
1304 # The shared secret use to "encrypt" and "sign" packets between
1305 # the NAS and FreeRADIUS. You MUST change this secret from the
1306 # default, otherwise it's not a secret any more!
1307 # The secret can be any string, up to 8k characters in length.
1308 # Control codes can be entered vi octal encoding,
1309 # e.g. "\101\102" == "AB"
1310 # Quotation marks can be entered by escaping them,
1311 # e.g. "foo\"bar"
1312 # A note on security: The security of the RADIUS protocol
1313 # depends COMPLETELY on this secret! We recommend using a
1314 # shared secret that is composed of:
1315 # upper case letters
1316 # lower case letters
1317 # numbers
1318 # And is at LEAST 8 characters long, preferably 16 characters in
1319 # length. The secret MUST be random, and should not be words,
1320 # phrase, or anything else that is recognizable.
1321 # The default secret below is only for testing, and should
1322 # not be used in any real environment.
1323 secret = testing123
1324 # Old-style clients do not send a Message-Authenticator
1325 # in an Access-Request. RFC 5080 suggests that all clients
1326 # SHOULD include it in an Access-Request. The configuration

```

```

1327 # item below allows the server to require it. If a client
1328 # is required to include a Message-Authenticator and it does
1329 # not, then the packet will be silently discarded.
1330 # allowed values: yes, no
1331 require_message_authenticator = no
1332 # The shortname is used as an alias for the fully qualified
1333 # domain name, or the IP address.
1334 # It is accepted for compatibility with 1.x, but it is no
1335 # longer necessary in 2.0
1336 shortname = localhost
1337 # the following three fields are optional, but may be used by
1338 # checkrad.pl for simultaneous use checks
1339 # The nastype tells 'checkrad.pl' which NAS-specific method to
1340 # use to query the NAS for simultaneous use.
1341 # Permitted NAS types are:
1342     cisco
1343     computone
1344     livingston
1345     max40xx
1346     multitech
1347     netserver
1348     pathras
1349     patton
1350     portslave
1351     tc
1352     usrhiper
1353     other
1354 nastype = other # localhost isn't usually a NAS...
1355 # The following two configurations are for future use.
1356 # The 'naspaswd' file is currently used to store the NAS
1357 # login name and password, which is used by checkrad.pl
1358 # when querying the NAS for simultaneous use.
1359 login = !root
1360 password = someadminpas
1361 # As of 2.0, clients can also be tied to a virtual server.
1362 # This is done by setting the "virtual_server" configuration
1363 # item, as in the example below.
1364 virtual_server = home1
1365 # A pointer to the "home_server_pool" OR a "home_server"
1366 # section that contains the CoA configuration for this
1367 # client. For an example of a coa home server or pool,
1368 # see raddb/sites-available/originate-coa
1369 coa_server = coa
1370 }
1371 # IPv6 Client
1372 #client ::1 {
1373 #     secret = testing123
1374 #     shortname = localhost
1375 #}
1376 # All IPv6 Site-local clients

```

```

1377 #client fe80::/16 {
1378 #     secret      = testing123
1379 #     shortname    = localhost
1380 #}
1381 #client some.host.org {
1382 #     secret      = testing123
1383 #     shortname    = localhost
1384 #}
1385 # You can now specify one secret for a network of clients.
1386 # When a client request comes in, the BEST match is chosen.
1387 # i.e. The entry from the smallest possible network.
1388 client 192.168.0.0/24 {
1389 #     secret      = testing123-1
1390 #     shortname    = private-network-1
1391 #}
1392 #
1393 #client 192.168.0.0/16 {
1394 #     secret      = testing123-2
1395 #     shortname    = private-network-2
1396 #}
1397 client 172.20.10.13 {
1398     secret      = testing123
1399     shortname    = private-network-2
1400 }
1401 #client 10.10.10.10 {
1402 #     # secret and password are mapped through the "secrets" file.
1403 #     secret      = testing123
1404 #     shortname    = liv1
1405 #     # the following three fields are optional, but may be used by
1406 #     # checkrad.pl for simultaneous usage checks
1407 #     nastype      = livingston
1408 #     login        = !root
1409 #     password     = someadminpas
1410 #}
1411 #####
1412 #
1413 # Per-socket client lists. The configuration entries are exactly
1414 # the same as above, but they are nested inside of a section.
1415 # You can have as many per-socket client lists as you have "listen"
1416 # sections, or you can re-use a list among multiple "listen" sections.
1417 # Un-comment this section, and edit a "listen" section to add:
1418 # "clients = per_socket_clients". That IP address/port combination
1419 # will then accept ONLY the clients listed in this section.
1420 #clients per_socket_clients {
1421 #     client 192.168.3.4 {
1422 #         secret = testing123
1423 #     }
1424 #}
1425

```

1426

1427